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Abstract
In this project, I explore the relationship of biosocial perspectives, specifically the study of
energy and entropy, to contemporary work in criminology and social theory. After working
through an elaboration of entropy, I explore its relevance to social life through an eclectic but
necessary survey of a key set of scholars whose work focuses upon the sacrifice and
criminalization of the poor, the intensification of exclusion and genocidal contexts, and finally,
the possibility of a politics of change through indigenous knowledges. Bringing these various
schools of thought together allows us to see the interdisciplinary linkages that might better reveal
the urgency of emergency in our contemporary era.

Keywords: entropy, genocide, ghettoization, caste, biosocial criminology, cannibalism,
sacrifice
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Part I
Entropy as a biosocial imperative

Section I.i: Introduction:
In this project, I will lay out a biosocial framework based upon the study of energy and
entropy and explore its relevance for criminology. As a case, I will apply this framework to
Stuart Henry and Dragan Milovanovic’s constitutive criminology, to Loic Wacquant’s framing
of the criminalization of the urban poor, and to John Hagan’s criminology of genocide in
addition to contributions from numerous other authors and theorists. One implication of the
analysis is that, in fact, we are using people as a source of energy and irreversibly altering their
bodily integrity by means of the societal practices of sacrifice, war, and violence. I will draw
from the prior biosocial work of Anthony Walsh and Nicole Rafter to establish the viability of a
Post-Lombrosian biological theoretical framework in contemporary criminology. I will expand
this biosocial approach by incorporating the work on entropy of the 20th century economist
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen. The urgency of developing this analytical frame is necessitated by
the increasingly obvious interrelation of societal problems once considered to be separate issues.
I will explore the interconnection of economics with criminal justice and violence in
order to discover the essential link between these phenomena which unites the imperative to
commit violence with the imperative to engage in the economic process. In order to describe this
connection, I will present the central tenets of Georgescu-Roegen’s theory of the interaction
between the second law of thermodynamics and the anthropocentric economy. Furthermore, I
will extend Georgescu-Roegen’s (1971:306-315) understanding of the social ramifications of his
theory of economic entropy and interpolate the centrality of violence, consumption, and sacrifice
into his framework in order to reach the source of violence. This is intended as a “replacement
discourse” (Henry and Milovanovic 1996:203-211) which builds from a synergy of older work
with the explicit intent of setting a new foundation unencumbered by the operational rules of
previous frameworks. Entropy is a part of our daily experience as human beings and being
actively aware of its ramifications and our interaction with this physical property of the world
around us could serve an emancipatory function in linking seemingly disparate social problems
in a manner more conducive to limiting their destructiveness.
In order to accomplish the above, I rely on frameworks that include cultural, structural,
and biosocial explanations. To hinder ourselves by explaining all phenomena by means of the
exact same framework limits our ability to appreciate the dynamism of social life. Humans are
complicated physical beings who manifest culture and to a great extent rely on social
technologies—both material and behavioral—which so obviously allow us the power to
collectively reshape the world in our image. It is my hypothesis that our dependence upon and
resistance to entropy is situated at the intersection of our cultural, structural, and biological
existence and, therefore, the seemingly inexplicable may be explained by means of an improved
understanding of this physical law.
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Henry and Milovanovic (1996:220-21) combat the idea that we must become “excessive
investors” of “energy in the power to control others;” rather they suggest that pre-emptive
measures based on their “social judo” concept of gentle counter-violence are the key to evolving
a superior criminology and a less violent world. Henry and Milovanovic (1996:220) situate their
innovations in the tradition of “peacemaking criminology” advocated by Pepinsky and Quinney.
Their strategy based on the avoidance of countering violence with violence after the fact, when
possible, is the most advanced and reasonable strategy to deal with the problems of violence
posed by late modern society. Georgescu-Roegen (1971:306-07) makes it very clear that the
demands of entropy impose competition which can potentially lead to conflict between all forms
of biological life—in fact this is the tendency more than the exception. What GeorgescuRoegen’s (1971) interpretation means is that while coercion to some degree is unavoidable, the
distribution and severity of resultant violence are by no means foregone conclusions; it is,
therefore, reasonable to seek the most egalitarian distribution of both the benefits and detriments
of our interaction with entropy in order to insure the least harm and greatest benefit are derived
by members of society.
At present, our modern globalized society is fraught with social problems and economic
inefficiencies. This is unsurprising considering the recent escalation of so many of our current
arenas of contention—broadly our problems center around environmental degradation and the
allocation of resources, economic issues related to assimilating and transforming naturally
occurring resources for human use and distribution, and the economy of violence in both internal
(policing) and external (warfare) spaces. Perhaps, it is not only our appreciation of the
interconnectedness of these issues that is increasing; it may be that the dynamic interplay of
social forces in late modernity means that any disruption in the delicately balanced equilibrium
upon which we rely must result in an exponentially greater disturbance in comparison to earlier
phases of society. This phenomenon renders these issues even more threatening at their
intersections, but the zones where these problems overlap also present the best laboratory for
formulating solutions. It is in entropy, the second law of thermodynamics, that we find one such
laboratory which offers the answers to so many disparate questions.
I will analyze the demands of entropy as they together form a social imperative which
motivates so much of human behavior. I will position this within the body of criminological
literature which focuses on the most deleterious results of the competition for low entropy—
namely segregation, economic inequality, mass incarceration, ghettoization, and genocide. By
reaching a certain level of comprehension of the demands made upon us at the biological level
by the physical forces of entropy, we may be able to calibrate our exertions to more efficiently
perpetuate our society while reducing the harm1 done to the environment and to each other.
What we refer to as structure and culture are largely the effects of observable behaviors
which can only have meaning attributed to them through the signals of the human brain. These
are essentially electrical signals which animate a biological computer. These signals can be
communicated from one set of hardware to the next. Within the hardware, they will have to be
I intend the term as defined by Presser (2013:3-7) who asserts that “harm” encompasses a broad
array of social behaviors and their intended and unintended consequences; it is a more politically
“progressive” than the category of “crime” and can serve in its place, opening new possibilities
in social research.
1
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interpreted, and an appropriate reaction will be chosen based on the functioning of the hardware
and software at that moment in time. That is to say that the human mind and the communication
between individuals is essentially a bio-electro-chemical technology which our genes
genealogically developed through the process of evolution. We extend the various technologies
of self-preservation and furtherance of our genes by means of the sorts of technologies which we
more commonly label as such.
It is essentially impossible to discuss society or culture without an understanding of
where it materially exists. Walsh and Beaver (2009) preface their edited volume Biosocial
Criminology with a defense of the much maligned practice of incorporating biological science
into social theory. It is reasonable that the scientific community should fear eugenics and the
deleterious social effects that can result from the extension of theories such as those of Cesare
Lombroso. It is necessary, however, that individuals who embrace the practice of the scientific
method admit a connection when it is readily apparent from the data. Citing a study by Herbert
(1997), Walsh and Beaver (2009:1) state that it is evident that, most often, modern biological
explanations agree with the conclusions of “left-leaning sociologists;” in defense of applying
biological explanations, they cite the potential for employing more precise “theories, models,
methodologies, concepts [and] instruments” in an interdisciplinary effort to calibrate
criminological theories. There could not be a more scientific endeavor than triangulating the
validity of theory by means of the study of observable phenomena and the application of a
broader peer review—these are at the heart of the project that Walsh and Beaver (2009:1) refer to
as their “biosocial approach.” Walsh and Beaver (2009:2) continue by drawing a parallel with
the experience of physicists and chemists; according to Walsh and Beaver, these once separate
fields have by necessity become highly integrated due to the intrinsically requisite nature of
understanding one science in order to understand the other. Walsh and Beaver (2009: 2) predict
that there may be a time when criminology and biology will be similarly intertwined. The
failures of the past should not hinder scientific progress, but if one were to entertain reservations,
it would be due to a reasonable grasp of the historical experience and the political climate, rather
than to any undue timidity or dogmatic obduracy.
Walsh and Beaver (2009:3) remain adamant that an understanding of the human brain is
necessary for formulating a reasonably complete understanding of human behavior. It is difficult
to argue against this point. Walsh and Beaver (2009:3) apply what is essentially a public health
argument that “genetic” and “biological” are essentially different concepts, and that a biological
understanding of criminogenic environmental factors may serve to “strengthen our claims for
preventative environmental intervention.” This perspective negates traditional claims of
Lombrosian “atavism” or predetermination and supports interventionism in communities
suffering the effects of poverty, insufficient infrastructure, and subpar education. This biosocial
perspective also emphasizes the importance of evolutionary psychology, which assumes, as a
given, the critical criminological perspective that behavior within the normal human range is
labeled as criminal but may serve an evolutionarily adaptive purpose (Walsh and Beaver 2009:
4). Biological determinism is by extension of this cultural understanding of crime, an outmoded
concept. Henry and Milovanovic (1996:236), themselves chaos theorists, agree and advocate the
wide adoption of a post-deterministic model in order to improve the discipline—emphasizing
that we must avoid the mistakes of the past which include, at their zenith, the “ossification” of
structure and hierarchy.
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Biological determinism should not be revived in the discipline of criminology. It has
proven a font of racism and misinformation since its adoption in the latter part of the 19th
century, largely due to the contributions of the famous Italian physician and criminologist Cesare
Lombroso (Rafter 2008:66-67). The widespread deterministic racial typologies of the 19th
century targeted disenfranchised communities, such as black people and the Roma, as scapegoats
for all criminal activity under the simplistic and reductionist notion of evolutionary atavism
(Rafter 2008:67). These attitudes culminated in what Rafter has characterized as “criminology’s
darkest hour:” namely the eugenics-centric “criminal-biology” developed and implemented in
Nazi Germany (2008:176) and, then, largely emulated by the “post-Lombrosian” Italian fascists
(2008:194). In both national arenas, races of darker skin color and Jews were targeted for
exclusion, disenfranchisement, and both systemic and systematic destruction (Rafter 2008:195).
It is natural and right that as we enter the twenty-first century we should seek to distance
ourselves from the extreme crimes of the past to which our discipline contributed. The better
portion of resurrecting a biosocial approach without resurrecting the criminogenic and genocidal
racism of past eugenics programs is to rid ourselves of two foundational ideas. Firstly, we must
reject all notions of biological determinism. There is no determinism that will not lead to false
positives for criminality which will in turn result in discrimination that must ultimately lead to
real material harms to those unjustly profiled by the adopted determinist criteria. Secondly, we
must reject the dramatically unscientific notion of race. Differences between racial groups
cannot form the foundation for behavior. We must appreciate the socially constructed nature of
human behavior and identity. If we are able to develop a biosocial paradigm which is primarily
concerned with the epigenetic interactions between the individual as a physical, biological being
and the complex, multi-faceted, and dynamic social reality which constitutes the context of the
lived experience of any human being, then we will be moving in the right direction.
The question then arises, “Why bother studying biological concepts at all?” Scientific
materialism would suggest that besides the social aspect, the human being is a biological
organism with behaviors that must in some manner result from this fact, considering that all
biological organisms must pursue certain imperatives in order to ensure their survival and
support their self-replication. It is unreasonable to expect that human beings should be exempt
from this natural law. That being stated, a reductionist perspective can never serve to encompass
the intricacies of human behavior, which, more so than in the case of any other animal, is
affected by the powerful, invisible force of millennia of tradition. Furthermore, our tendencies to
innovate our technology and to renovate our social systems add a dynamism to our behavior that
can render it incomprehensible as a whole. Fortunately, as our communication technologies
develop, we are afforded a unique opportunity to engage in a broad-based, metacognitive
exercise which would have been impossible a few generations ago. Our ability to surveil and
statistically study the behavior of the human animal is reaching new heights. At the same time,
Western medical technology is looking deeper within—aided by newly developed tools that are
increasingly unraveling the mysteries of the mechanisms of the human brain and of the body’s
commensurate sensitivity to external stimuli in real time. These developments recommend a
new emphasis on biosocial approaches because new tools will open new possibilities for
research.
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Section I.ii: Entropy—as it connects the economy and the criminal justice system
The criminal justice system is the organ of society responsible for enforcing all other
mandates. Although social mores, norms, and taboos exist within a culture to maintain order and
conformity and, therefore, ease the functioning of a eusocial daily existence—ultimately, the
non-compliant are met with force and physical incapacitation. Violence is the one universal
imperative. Violence is, no matter how distressing, essentially born not of chaos alone, but of a
certain form of order. To make sense of what seems senseless violence, we must strive to
understand that order.
Economic principles reach beyond what is commonly considered “the economy.”
Beyond buying and selling, the economy shapes our personal and interpersonal worlds and
economic principles govern behaviors that might seem inexplicable. We must bear in mind that
“economy” is the name we put to the fundamental imperatives of social life, the activities that
support all necessary biological functions and allow for us to focus on those needs higher up
Maslow’s hierarchy. Economic principles shape our world. If the economy is such an integral
part of the human experience—as violence is, as well—should we not expect the two phenomena
to intertwine?
The question that this line of inquiry subsequently begs is, “At what juncture do violence
and economy overlap?” What is the nature of their interaction, and how does it affect us all? It
is reasonable to assume that if the economy shapes our lives as the most compelling fundamental
current, then violence should likely be an outgrowth of the economic epicenter of human
behavior. Similarly, without violence as the arch guarantor of the economy, the economy could
not exist. Therefore, sublimated human aggression must be the substance of our species-wide
eusociality. What, however, are the forces against which we—as a cooperative group—strive so
fiercely?
The forces which together constitute the foundational imperative for our eusociality are
not chaotic or random in essence. Rather, they are relatively well-understood scientific
principles which manifest in a manner that we experience as at once obfuscated and intimately
familiar. These are the forces of the creation and destruction of organization, cohesion, and
value which the ancients once worshipped and feared. We are no less in the grip of these forces
now, despite our technological and social advancements. In fact, we may have freed ourselves
from the bonds of an extrinsic divina natura, only to have shackled ourselves to the flux of our
own social dynamics; it certainly appears that we have done so. The forces of destruction and
creation which encompass these dynamics in their polarity unite at one particular juncture—a yin
and yang of the opposing forces which comprise the two faces of Janus. That locus of the
liminality of all things is entropy.

Section I.iii: What entropy is
The principle of entropy, while obscure in its applicability to human life in its purely
thermodynamic application, is central in its biological implications. The two applications of the
term are functionally separate due to our distance from entropic equilibrium, as well as the open
state of energy transfer to our system. I will demonstrate that much of human behavior is
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connected foundationally to the demands of the economy of biological entropy which can only
exist when a closed system near equilibrium is not the case.
The importance of entropy for human sociality and development is traced by Kimball to
the ancients; according to Kimball (2007:42), the observation can be traced to both the Greek
philosopher Epicurus and the later 1st century BC Roman poet Lucretius. The limitations the
second law of thermodynamics places on human biological life is central to human sociality.
Kimball (2007:42) asserts, citing Depew and Weber, that “[a]ll ‘living systems…pay what they
owe to the second law by building internal kinetic pathways that send things in their
environment, instead of themselves, to thermodynamic equilibrium,’” which is a state not
conducive to the continuation of biological life. Kimball (2007:42) explains that:
These pathways are part of the means by which living things dissipate the
accumulation of entropy—that is, divert it away from themselves. The selforganizing complexity of living things able to extract energy from their
environments and convert it to their uses is always purchased at the cost of an
increase in entropy somewhere else…What obtains at the organismic level occurs
at the ecological: every ecosystem must pay a continuous thermodynamic cost, and
entropy price in the form of dissipated heat, for capturing and channeling the
biologically useful energy of the earth.

Kimball (2007:43) continues, once more referencing Depew and Weber, “‘[e]cosystems favor
species that, in funneling energy into their own production and reproduction, also increase the
total energy flow through the system…[t]he effect is to increase the dissipation of energy as
entropy production to the surroundings.”’ The inevitable conclusion of Kimball’s (2007:43) line
of reasoning is that we must pay a cost in entropy for our economic activities and that our
resources are “‘inescapably finite,’” to repeat the characterization that Kimball borrows from
Garrett Hardin. Our one hope of maintaining our current level of entropic exchange is improved
technologies that more evenly distribute the results (both positive and negative) of the economic
processes of modern society (Kimball 2007). It is Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, however, who
provides the most compelling argument for a theory of thermodynamics as an explanation for the
imperatives of human economic processes which can be syncretized with sociological theory.
In Entropy and the Economic Process, Georgescu-Roegen (1971:276) asserts
“[e]xtravagant though this thesis may seem prima facie, thermodynamics is largely a physics of
economic value.” Georgescu-Roegen (1971:277) argues for an anthropocentric understanding of
thermodynamics as one of its central features, citing that the difference between “free” and
“latent” energy types is defined largely by what can be harnessed to human purposes. According
to Georgescu-Roegen (1971:277), “…the only reason why thermodynamics initially
differentiated between the heat contained in the ocean waters and that inside the ship’s furnace is
that we can use the latter but not the former.” Georgescu-Roegen (1971:277) reminds us that
“[a]pt though we are to lose sight of the fact, the primary objective of economic activity is the
self-preservation of the human species.” Georgescu-Roegen (1971:277) defines selfpreservation in accordance with his framework:
Self-preservation in turn requires the satisfaction of some basic
needs—which are nevertheless subject to evolution. The almost
6

fabulous comfort, let alone the extravagant luxury, attained by many
past and present societies has caused us to forget the most
elementary fact of economic life, namely, that of all necessaries for
life only the purely biological ones are absolutely indispensable for
survival. The poor have had no reason to forget it. And since
biological life feeds on low entropy, we come across the first
important indication of the connection between low entropy and
economic value.
All commodities are essentially valued for the property of low entropy—equating to a high
degree of internal organization—a fact that multiplies the efficient employment of the useful
properties of resources, whether they be energy concentrated in coal or oil products, or the
increased utility of a piece of iron when rendered into steel and formed into an ergonomic knife
(Georgescu-Roegen 1971:278). Energy has been expended in the shaping of these commodities
into the state in which they provide the maximum human ability to affect the world in a manner
consistent with human survival and self-perpetuation. Georgescu-Roegen (1971:278) surmises
“[w]e may then take it as a brute fact that low entropy is a necessary condition for a thing to be
useful.” Here, helpfully, Georgescu-Roegen (1971:278) separates utility from price and value:
“[b]ut usefulness by itself is not accepted as a cause of economic value even by the
discriminating economists who do not confuse economic value with price.”
The intrinsic value of a commodity (land for example) is quite different than a market
price; this value is derived from certain properties which further the cause of human survival
(Georgescu-Roegen 1971:278). In the case of land, its value is the ability to provide what
Georgescu-Roegen (1971:278) calls “the only net with which we can catch the most vital form of
low entropy for us [solar energy];” value also exists in the fact that “the size of the net [a parcel
of land] is immutable.” It should be noted that technology increases the utility of such necessary
fundamentals as land, but that Georgescu-Roegen’s formulation is essentially correct. Scarcity
as it applies to land and other commodities is operationalized thusly: “[o]ther things are scarce in
a sense that does not apply to land, because, first, the amount of low entropy within our
environment (at least) decreases continuously and irrevocably, and second, a given amount of
low entropy can be used by us only once” (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:278). Georgescu-Roegen
(1971) identifies this difference between land and other commodity types by accurately assessing
that one use for land that provides intrinsic value necessary to the project of society is that it
collects value through the low-entropy products which can gather energy to become our food
sources on that land. In the case of minerals, of course, the land more closely resembles the
other commodities which can only be mined for their low entropy products once. The ability to
only utilize a commodity—a source of low entropy—once adds to its scarcity, and this feature
usually translates into increased economic value. The traits of utility and value or scarcity and
value are, however, not necessarily connected in any concretely commensurate sense as price
and utility can be disproportionately separated by society; this is especially true in a society that
is highly organized and relies on elaborate financial systems.
The actual process of production relies upon entropy, Geogescu-Roegen (1971:279)
explains, however, the net of energy and low entropy at the end of the process is in excess of the
resultant low entropy; the production of commodities, therefore, always represents a net loss of
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low entropy. Consider the industrial production of copper sheeting from ore, for example
(Georgescu-Roegen 1971:279):
…we have merely sorted the copper molecules from all others, but in order to
achieve this result we have used up irrevocably a greater amount of low entropy
than the difference between the entropy of the finished product and that of the
copper ore…[t]he free energy used in production to deliver mechanical work—by
humans or machines—or to heat the ore is irrevocably lost.
Georgescu-Roegen (1971:279) corrects “the popular economic maxim” “‘you cannot get
something for nothing’” to read “’you cannot get anything but at a far greater cost in low
entropy.’” Economics has caught up to the implications of the first law of thermodynamics, but
not the second, for “the economic process,” (i.e. production) (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:280).
The implications of this logic can be expanded to all common apologist economic rationales for
Western capitalist imperialism (e.g. lack of education and an inadequate direction of human
resources result in the poverty of a nation, overpopulation results in issues which are entirely
curable) (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:280). Georgescu-Roegen (1971:281) asserts that “closed
system” explanations are to blame for our mystification of the economic process. The inputs
from nature are not calculated as part of the energy/entropy equation because our economic
calculations are usually based on cost and scarcity thus obscuring the actual function of naturally
occurring low entropy commodities to the economic chain. Humans may be counted among
these; although, in this era of recent trans-industrial capitalism,2 we are hardly naturally
occurring but represent a commodity type—“human resources,” which represent a reification of
labor, are a direct result of the economic process. In light of what this means for the human
condition in our era, the dire consequences can be summarized rather succinctly (GeorgescuRoegen 1971:281):
Even if only the physical facet of the economic process is taken into
consideration, this process is not circular, but unidirectional. As far
as this facet alone is concerned, the economic process consists of a
continuous transformation of low entropy into high entropy, that is,
into irrevocable waste or, with a topical term, into pollution. The
identity of this formula with that proposed by Schrodinger for the
biological process of a living cell or organism vindicates those
economists, who like Marshall, have been fond of biological
analogies and have even contended that economics ‘is a branch of
biology broadly interpreted.’ The conclusion is that, from the purely
physical viewpoint, the economic process is entropic: it neither
creates nor consumes matter or energy, but only transforms low into
high entropy.

2

This term was coined by Jon Shefner in a lecture on the foundations of political economy to
more accurately describe the situation that is often called “Post-Industrial.” The implication is
clearly that nations in the modern Global North are post-industrialized, but hardly beyond
reliance on industrial centers which have been relocated to the Global South in many cases.
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The difference between the “entropic process” of the environment and that of the economy is the
presence or absence of human labor as a factor (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:281-282).
At this juncture, Georgescu-Roegen (1971:282) departs from his strictly scientific
explanations and ventures to suggest the concept of “enjoyment of life” as an economic
“‘output.’” At first glance, it seems Georgescu-Roegen has surrendered to a conceit previously
avoided, but it may be necessary to engage in such vague description for his purposes to be
served. The best operationalization of the concept would be that cultural imperatives are
satisfied by the economic process. A purely structural explanation of the living economy, devoid
of any acknowledgment of the primacy of culture or agency in human affairs is not implied. The
tastes, desires, and subjective needs of the individual together form a definite contribution to the
shape of the economic process. These considerations are subordinated only to the cultural goals
of any given society within the framework of entropic possibilities. Culture shapes the desires
and abilities of the individual. Georgescu-Roegen illuminates the idea of “the enjoyment of life”
(1971:282) with the slightly more workable term “psychic flux” (1971:284)—a phenomenon
which he uses in contrast to the idea of a “material flow,” adding that “the flux of life enjoyment
has an intensity at each instant of time.” This accords with Durkheim’s (1897/1979) finding that
those who commit anomic suicide are very often successful persons who, with no avenue of
growth open to them to increase their happiness in a capitalist society, commit suicide out of
frustration for the dullness of a life which represents the pinnacle of sensation that their society
can afford. Georgescu-Roegen (1971:284) accurately notes that ennui of this sort is likely to
befall a millionaire who loses his fortune, but Durkheim’s analysis is the more insightful of the
two, depending not on obvious misfortune, but agreeing on principle nonetheless. According to
Georgescu-Roegen (1971:284) a salient trait of the economic process is its precariousness;
sensation is by nature perishable, unlike so many other valued commodities which are brought to
bear in its service.
Georgescu-Roegen reduces the “psychic flux” (1971:284) of the economic process to a
simple equation (1971:285): “e=Consumption enjoyment + Leisure Enjoyment – Work
Drudgery.” He qualifies each by intensity in order to more accurately represent the subjectivity
of the economic experience, with the assumption that consumption must proceed uninterrupted at
a basic level beneath what is considered optimal or enjoyable at minimum in order to maintain
the metabolism of a modern society (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:285). It is by means of
Georgescu-Roegen’s reductionist but theoretically useful formula that the phenomenology of
labor may be explored in greater depth.

Section I.iv: What entropy means for the lived experience of the laborer: on
the topic of consumptive communities
Anthropologists have long observed that it is important to study the groups in which
humans consume food. The family unit is likely the first and most important, but various other
peer groups with shared interests commonly share meals. From business meetings, to catered
luncheons at the academy, to burgers and fries in a squad car, the arrangement of people with
whom we eat and the conventions governing behavior in these settings reaffirm much of the
cultural narrative.
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If the foods we consume represents not only the selections themselves, but include, as a
necessary component, the energy and low entropy of the army of factory workers, truck drivers,
cooks, servers, cashiers, and business administrators necessary to make sure it arrives on our
plates, and also the energy and low-entropy of all the people whose labor fed into producing
materials for packaging as well as eating utensils, restaurant decorations, furniture, etc. that
constitute the environment and necessary preconditions and preparations for the meal, then the
energies and entropic conversions represented by the food items themselves constitute only a
portion of the meal. The energy an individual has put into “winning” the “bread” is also
consumed in a form of auto-anthropophagy. The problem with our current cultural
understanding is that we take special note of the energies expended in order to use the
capitalism-mediated market in order to acquire food (or other goods) without paying much
attention to the energies that went into the item’s creation and transport. We assume that the
final price represents all of the aforementioned and that our energies are equal to the energies
expended in order to produce goods and to transport them and to assure that they are retailed.
This, simply put, is not the case.
Calculating the amount of person-hours which went into all of these considerations,3 we
must understand that if we were paying a fair price, there would be no use in buying anything,
but rather we should make all of our goods ourselves. There is always a form of coercion
inherent to capitalist prices that makes engaging in capitalist acquisition always a good deal at
the expense of others. Because it is absolutely impossible to create something from nothing,
time must always beget more time in exchange, money must beget more money, and skill more
skill, otherwise capitalism, which feeds entirely on the accumulation and bartering of surplus,
must immediately fail.
When we consume a meal, we are not only consuming the products of a single person’s
labor or its equivalent, but rather we are forming a node of accumulation of value (i.e. energy
and low entropy) in a vast, global ecosystem managed by violence and violent coercion. When
we consume a meal we are consuming both varieties of energy, both the personal investment of
the individual who paid the price as well as the energies and low entropy of all the individuals
whose labor fed into the consumption of that meal. That principle holds true for other varieties
of consumables as well and is the basis for all class and caste systems. We seek to
psychologically distance ourselves from those whose labor we coercively consume due to our
guilt surrounding the subject. The key to consuming anything is to make sure it has been
culturally transformed from “raw” to “cooked” (Levi-Strauss 1986:40). This is why we prefer
pleasant, attractive, clean people preparing and serving our food; although cleanliness is
necessary for the safe-handling of food, these other factors fulfill a certain cosmetic cultural
desire. This transformation is necessary for cultural acceptance and both structural and bodily
incorporation. To note that the cultural transformation and re-packaging of energy and entropy
has occurred is what allows us to feel comfortable in a consumptive situation. Nowhere is this

3

These include the energies which must have been expended in the creation of stable governance
in a region from which materials come, stable measures and currency values, as well as the
necessary infrastructure for the transportation of goods and a seemingly endless but not
incalculable list of other expenditures.
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distinction more prevalent than in considerations of caste—which I will operationalize as the
interstices of race and class.
One of the greatest dangers of this arrangement on a structural level is that colonial
situations always collapse in the wake of the retreat of the imperial power because the
knowledge of the necessary restraint requisite in the wielding of the technological power
imparted by the imperialists is lacking in the culture of the previously ruled—this situation is a
prerequisite for the exercise of the same power on the part of the imperialists and, therefore, must
always be present. A slow transition from the imperial government can remedy this problem by
fostering a culture of exploitation sophisticated enough to withstand the power differential
generated by the imperial technology of entropic extraction. In order to wield this destructive
technology in the least exploitative manner, it must be properly understood and calibrated.
The arithmetic of energy and entropy is straightforward and mostly well understood.
Economists maintain elaborate measures of quality of life. We can measure work output and
possess well-developed rubrics for quality in many fields. We can measure calories needed by
humans, the gallons of water necessary to produce the food that provides those calories, and the
minerals, petroleum, timber, and other material resources necessary for infrastructure to make
sure that distribution happens more or less equitably and a relatively high quality of life is
maintained. We must be more conscientious as to whence human energy and low entropy come
and where they accumulate in reservoirs of reified value. We must be mindful, as feminists point
out, of the nurturing work necessary not only to raise a human being, but also to maintain a
functioning one. In essence, a mother (women are still overwhelmingly the primary childcare
providers), must use the energy and low entropy of her body4 in order to maintain herself and
also to rear her children and frequently to sustain a significant other’s personal needs a well. A
worker must provide for his or her personal needs (frequently with the aid of a partner or family
members) as well as provide the necessary energy and entropy for the needs of the employer.
All of this is conducted in a state of competition in a world full of over seven billion competitors
for life-giving resources. Human zones of contention for this energy and entropy include
competition for space, shelter, clean air, clean water, food, parental attention, regard by peers,
sexual attention from prospective partners, and, of course, for decreasingly available (due to
mechanization, computerization, and outsourcing) currency providing positions that serve
primarily to establish the pecking order for all of the other zones of contention for energy and
low entropy.
Barbara Ehrenreich, in conducting research for her book, Nickel and Dimed (2008),
assumed a lifestyle similar to that led by some of the poorest Americans, extremely privileged
people on a global scale, but the underclass upon which our society is built. The conclusion to
which Ehrenreich (2008:221) comes when considering our entropic “food web” is illuminating:
Guilt, you may be thinking warily. Isn’t that what we’re supposed
to feel? But guilt doesn’t go anywhere near far enough; the
appropriate emotion is shame—shame at our own dependency, in
this case, on the underpaid labor of others. When someone works
This is a “food” web that includes all the congealed energies of the people who made her
clothes and food or provided her other resources, often undercompensated laborers in faraway
locations.
4
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for less pay than she can live on—when, for example, she goes
hungry so that you can eat more cheaply and conveniently—then
she has made a great sacrifice for you, she has made you a gift of
some part of her abilities, her health, and her life. The “working
poor,” as they are approvingly termed, are in fact the major
philanthropists of our society. They neglect their own children so
that the children of others will be cared for; they live in
substandard housing so that other homes will be shiny and perfect;
they endure privation so that inflation will be low and stock prices
high. To be a member of the working poor is to be an anonymous
donor, a nameless benefactor, to everyone else. As Gail, one of
my restaurant coworkers put it, “you give and you give.”

Ehrenreich (2008) continues by foretelling a day that the underclass will arise and demand
respect and remuneration commensurate to their contributions, which she optimistically expects
to result in a better, more just society for all. The underclass, however, is not being oppressed
solely by what she describes as a form of Marxian false-consciousness (Ehrenreich 2008). The
oppression of people in society, and the governance of those who win a more equitable
compensation than the people about whom Ehrenreich writes, is an extremely carefully
orchestrated structural situation. This structure takes advantage of the most altruistic human
interpersonal interactions to create a repressive mechanism which, like any well-designed and
efficient machine, produces work exponentially greater than input force—a mechanical
advantage, that is. Ehrenreich’s analysis (2008) is partially correct; we do depend on the good
will of others, but not directly. It is not as if the people we oppress could simply decide to quit
giving of themselves. We have constructed elaborate structures which promise them great
personal and psychological harm should they do so. From not possessing sufficient money for
rent and being forced out onto the street, to being arrested and having their children separated
from them by armed men and women employed by the state, the power of millions of people and
billions of dollars (a functionally coercive incentive) is arrayed against each and every one of us
who expresses an unwillingness to conform usefully as is appropriate to our assigned stations in
life. It is not the case, as can be seen when considering this array of force, that these people of
whom Ehrenreich speaks are the greatest philanthropists because they cannot give willingly of
themselves what will otherwise be taken by force. It is, perhaps, a sign of Ehrenreich’s class
privilege that she cannot see the whips of the masters of her coworkers, despite all her
knowledge of the factual conditions of their oppression.
Ideological justifications of human difference combine with well-established human
biological tendencies to create stratified social structures to which a majority of human problems
can readily be attributed. Allowing human beings greater economic and political equality affords
greater dignity to the known biological equality of the human species. A carefully planned social
structure could maintain current levels of productivity with more equitable distribution of the
benefits of human labor. Because we are demonstrably living in an autopoeitic—to borrow a
term from Luhmann—human-constructed and human dominated ecosystem (Luhmann 1990:117), we must acknowledge that a flourishing of this system depends on equilibrium and
symbiosis, rather than a form of predation which is environmentally wasteful and expensive in
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terms of misappropriated human energies. An illustration of this principle can be found in
Foucault’s (2008:56-60) discussion of globalization as a “natural” paradigm in the view of
economists and in his commentary on the necessary equilibrium between European “police
states” which maintains a semblance of peace. Equilibrium does not necessitate peace, but a
balancing of competing forces, and this is the goal towards which we must strive.
It is the “self-referential” nature of late modernity which designates its break with the
previous stages of modernization (Luhmann 1990:130-141). Due to the forces of globalization,
and the intensification and expansion of modernity, human systems have been rendered “selfreferential;” Luhmann (1990:130-141) reaches the conclusion that human systems have been so
isolated from competition with other natural forces and have become so “self-referential” that the
distinction between manifest and latent functions is null and that society generates the defining
reality against which it must define itself. Agamben (1998:187) comes to a similar conclusion
that, under a fascist political system, in the person of the Fuhrer, law and biology become one,
and in this way human intentionality becomes “indistinct” from biological reality. This is not to
assert that all political systems are as extreme as fascism, but that all late modern political
arrangements have the potential to gravitate toward that extreme. Late modern societies are
characterized by an inability to isolate the effects of human actions from the causes of other
actions; the whirring machinery of late modern society generates its own centripetal inertia.
If late modern social systems are capable of their own form of “autopoiesis” (Luhmann
1990:1-17); there remains no possibility of a true emancipation, but only the possibility of a
lessened exploitation for the people who comprise the extractive medium of late modern
societies. If the medium of exploitation is the human body and its coexistent potential to
generate person-hours of energy as a source of power for the machinery of society, and if it is,
also, the case that we cannot devise a method to cease the centripetal inertia of society without
cataclysmic effects, then we must endeavor to regulate more fairly the medium of exchange. We
must seek the transformation from a medium of exploitation, to a medium of symbiotic
transaction. This is the variety of “replacement discourse” that Henry and Milovanovic
(1996:203) imagined; we should implement their “social judo” (1996:220) to realize this
discourse. We must bend these macro-level structural forces to our collective benefit in order to
accommodate our increasingly apparent biological imperatives. We can and must usurp the
biopower which has been engineered towards the goal of our oppression and arrayed against us
for the last few centuries. While emancipation may well be impossible due to the limitations of
our own physicality, we can constitute a synergized paradigm which dictates a new selfownership of this very physicality which has so long provided the mechanism of our oppression.
The next section will explore the extent to which an evolving understanding of entropy as it
affects biological life can contribute to the project of developing a Judo of calibration.

Section I.v: Biological entropy
The laboratory experiments of Jeremy England (2013) suggest that biological life could
have originated as a mechanism for inanimate matter to dispel energy more efficiently. In his
experiment with chemical baths, it seems that entropy shapes the seemingly anomalous behavior
of matter far from entropic equilibrium. It is important to note that we are not referring to the
entropy of systems near their energetic equilibrium, rather, in order to understand entropy as it
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relates to biological life, we must study systems that are far from their maximum dissipation of
energy. Biological life always exists in a state in which energy is entering a system and being
dissipated—not a closed system which according to the second law of thermodynamics must
reach a state of equilibrium which by its very nature precludes the possibility of life. Life
depends on an entropy gradient and must seek low entropy in order to maintain the integrity of
the biological body and to self-replicate (England 2013). These are the primary traits of
biological life.
Social theorists from Aristotle to Herbert Spencer have depended on an analogy between
society and the functioning of a biological organism. Emile Durkheim’s Division of Labor in
Society (1933) describes organic solidarity and mechanical solidarity in a manner reminiscent of
organs and tissues, respectively. A biological analogy is not an unprecedented concept in
sociology; however, it was impossible until now—in an era of a rapid succession of
breakthroughs in physics and biology—for us to know how accurate the analogy made by these
thinkers actually is.
If seeking low entropy is a biological imperative of the individual organism and of the
social unit or family of these organisms, then it stands to reason that the imperative to seek low
entropy should be an imperative of more complex social organizations as well. We should
expect organizations such as corporations and government bureaus to seek the maximum
available supplies of low entropy in order to maintain their organization and to grow. They must
maintain their survival as semi-biological entities (living systems whose constituents are
biological beings) in order to reproduce their cells (employees or officials), tissues (committees
within the broader organization), and perhaps even themselves. In the next section, I will
circumscribe what entropy is not, in order to improve its utility as a theoretical concept.

Section I.vi: What entropy is not
To equate any particular substance with entropy is to fail to grasp the concept. It is true
that energy may be accessed by humans by harnessing the stored energy in some low-entropy
products such as petroleum, especially with the assistance of the donation of the low entropy of
human labor as amplified by technology in order to free more energy from the raw material (e.g.
refining gasoline, natural gas, kerosene, diesel, etc.) or to render it more applicable for processes
that are useful to the human economy (hexanes and other industrial solvents).
Money is not entropy; neither is gold (Georgescu-Roegen 1986:8). There have been
social theorists (such as Sergei Podolinsky5) since the time of Marx (Foster and Burkett 2004)
who sought answers in such reductionism, but according to Georgescu-Roegen (1986), these
answers all fail to prove sufficient. The financial systems serve the social function of allocating
the rights to low entropy sources, from petroleum, to labor, to land, but they themselves do not
represent the real economy, which is by its nature dependent on human labor and the available
energy and low entropy of numerous resources. Money and financial instruments represent a
dialectic with the flow of entropy that constitutes the real economy. The third branch of this
interplay is enforcement. Enforcement can be openly violent, or it can be a subtle culture of
5

Podolinsky combined a study of energy and agriculture with Marxist economics (Foster and
Burkett 2004).
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observing the rights of certain individuals to low entropy and denying the rights of others. A
mixture of these strategies tends to characterize every human society, with different societies
adopting different stances, standards, definitions, and methods.
Since the human ability to exploit low entropy sources is inherently technological, there
tends to be diffusion of certain strategies over time as they prove beneficial. The technology of
low entropy retrieval, management, and consumption consists of essentially two parts. One part
is technological in the traditional sense of creating tools and utilizing them to reshape the world
around us. The other part is developing social systems to ensure that these tools have skilled
users and can be controlled and implemented for the betterment of the dominant elements of
society. This is not to state a moral position that the dominant individuals in society should
decide the flow of low entropy—it is to describe a pattern. Power and the direction of the flow
of entropy are one in the same. In order to understand the generation of social power, we must
study the central mechanism of its creation—namely, sacrifice.

Section I.vii: The centrality of sacrifice to the social project
The ability to manifest irreversibility or irrevocability in the material world is the primary
means by which we manipulate reality. The moment of irreversibility is the moment at which
reproduction has occurred in cells undergoing mitosis (England 2013). The ability to create that
which is irrevocable is the moment at which we have permanently altered physical reality. In
cellular reproduction, a certain amount of low entropy and energy must be converted to high
entropy, generating waste, in order for reproduction to occur (England 2013). The project of
society depends upon this juncture. In our culture, we practically worship the liminal experience
at the edge of irrevocability. The most extreme form of this fetishism is the fetishism of death.
Its reverse, the irrevocable creation of new life takes second place only in that the experience of
creating life is less universal than the experience of the anticipation of the death of the self and of
bearing witness to death of another. This is the quintessence of the experience of life and is the
core of the human experience. Everything we consume in the form of nourishment must have
been created, must have lived, and must die. We draw the low entropy from food sources daily,
if we are fortunate; otherwise, eventually we meet the irrevocable limit of our own existence.
The importance of the meal as the basic unit of familial bonding has not escaped social
scientists. The discipline of anthropology has a long tradition of addressing social practices that
involve a sense of the numinous in association with rituals of the body. Ritual pollution of
certain substances and of the self are particularly important within this tradition. According to
Claude Levi-Strauss (1986:40):
In every case, consequently, we encounter a double opposition, on
the one hand between raw and cooked, on the other between fresh
and rotten. The axis that joins the raw and the cooked is
characteristic of the transition to Culture; that joining the raw and
the rotten, of the return to nature. Thus cooking brings about the
cultural transformation of the raw, just as putrefaction brings about
a natural transformation.
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So in this explanation of the most basic dichotomies of human social life, Levi-Strauss highlights
the irrevocable. That which is raw is unsuitable as it has not been ritually purified.6 That which
is cooked has been culturally deemed suitable for literal incorporation into the body and into the
body politic by extension of this fact. Similarly, that which is putrid has been irrevocably
wasted. The parallel and opposite processes of cooking and putrefaction are central to the social
project. While what we cook, we incorporate; what we allow to putrefy, we waste. Either way,
low entropy is converted to high entropy. In both cases, created value is destroyed. It is the
necessary and intrinsic nature of this transfer of low entropy to high that we share. This
transformation is the cornerstone of society, and culture is the tradition of how we conceptualize
and interact with this physical reality.
In a larger sense, our time on earth is to be conceptualized in a similar manner. To the
Greeks, we are the ephemeroi, the “creatures of a day.” The way we choose to spend our short
time is, if we are fortunate, the only choice we will ever have afforded us; too often too many of
us have little say in this matter. We are literally awaiting our own putrefaction, and what is
more, perhaps alone among animals, we are perfectly aware of the fact. This is the source of our
desire to sacrifice. That which would otherwise linger on the slow path to putrefaction, we
instead ritually consume. It is the lone gesture of immortality of the ephemoroi; the only
grasping for immortality available to us in our meager capacity.
All societies are built on sacrificial violence. The concept of a nation is a construct based
upon a fictional historical past which is brought into a misrepresented historical present; the
concept of the national identity is an ontology and epistemology of its own. The construction of
cultural meaning requires sacrifice. This is intimately related to the structural importance of
religion as outlined by Emile Durkheim (1915). In order for meaning to be created in the
material world, it is necessary for sacrifice to be made to appease the numinous. All societies are
willing to sacrifice certain types of individuals to the construction of a sense of identity.
The soldier has been purified by his proximity to death. In Western European and EuroAmerican cultures – “death cultures” according to Russell Means (1995:553) – death is the
ultimate rite of purification. Therefore, the ascetic mortification of the body and the soldier’s
nearness to death represent a powerful liminality construct. This is the wellspring from which
the soldier’s exceptionalism is formed. All militarism originates in such a cosmology. This is an
extension of Foucault’s (1976/2003:259-60) description of the coextensive exposure of the
population to death as a rite of purification in certain authoritarian cultural contexts. The training
which a soldier endures is the preparation for an appropriate sacrifice. As the citizenry are
supposed to represent the divine family – the absolute good – for which the soldier is fighting,
the citizen cannot be sacrificed. It is only when the citizen is remade, relabeled, and purified by
means of proper training (i.e. ascetic mortification) – which results in a decoupling of the soul
and body, paradoxically enhancing the mana7 of both constitutive components – that he may be

6

Sanitation is often an element of cooking, but for our purposes, it is often beside the point
because we cook foods that can be eaten raw and prepare ones that may be eaten in their original
state to render them culturally incorporable.
7
Mana is a concept in Polynesian cultures which anthropologists have adopted as a coreconcept. It is a supernatural force which confers real social prestige. Mana is somewhat
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sacrificed to the numinous and to the divine family. It is Martha Nussbaum’s (2013:378)
contention that a “civil religion”—an outgrowth of civic “love”—is necessary for the
construction of the state, and the “civil religion” is what we must come to understand in order to
make sense of our world which has been constructed upon such a foundation. Love, however, is
an abstract concept which must be made manifest by inscription into a material world. It is the
sacrifice that is the ultimate proof of the positive existence of that love according to the societal
logic.
Conversely, the criminal is unsuitable for consumption and, therefore, represents “life
that cannot be sacrificed and yet may be killed,” according to Agamben (1998:82), because the
sacrifice is to be prepared for consumption for those within the numinous community – namely
the god and those included in his divine family. That which can be sacrificed is necessarily that
which is designed for the utmost incorporation into the community. This is why the Hebrew God
turned away Cain’s sacrifice, but accepted Abel’s. Can we say that the criminal is consumed in
the same manner as the sacrifice? Of course we may not; however, the very relegation of the
criminal to a position of this dubious sanctity is also a form of consumption. This is in much the
same way that waste is a consumption of that which begins acceptable to consume but is
rendered by the process of degradation unpalatable or no longer useful. The soldier represents
the opposite of waste, a destruction of value that cannot represent waste but instead represents
the most supreme sacrifice. The reverse, the criminal, is also a sacrifice by another name with
the latter case being devoted to the eternal forces of corruption in order to complete the necessary
moral duality as mandated by our dichotomy of Good and Evil. Perhaps, it is poignant and
appropriate that in the Genesis tale of Cain and Abel, sacrifice and criminality – the concepts
which form the key underpinnings of our criminal justice system – find their nascence in the
exact same aetiological parable.

Section I.viii: On sacrifice
The original sacrifice was a meal. The meal was ideally made of choice ingredients, the
most valuable due to the logic explored above, was the sacrifice of flesh and blood, tallow and
bone. It is the material from which we are made; by extension, the material of the body politic.
Flesh and blood is all we have been and all, for most of human history, we had reason to expect
our future generations to be. On some level, we have always appreciated that grasping for the
numinous requires an acceptance of the obvious limitations of the flesh. We can, in the case of
asceticism, regiment the flesh or even mortify it while yet alive, or we can, in the case of
sacrifice, destroy the flesh to gain the favor of the numinous—to bring it into being the only way
we know how. The social function of this behavior clearly has a real material effect. The
sanctified meal is our oldest ritual.
A description from Kimball (2007:235) of ancient Greek sacrifice will prove instructive;
here he discusses Walter Burkert’s Greek Religion:
At the climax of the sacrifice, the sacrificer exsanguinates the
animal and collects its blood, which he sprays over the top and the
analogous to fortuna or luck, with an emphasis on the non-random and personal nature of the
mystical force.
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sides of the altar. During this ritual splattering the women begin to
ululate, and the rite reaches its “emotional climax” as “life screams
over death.” The priests then promptly skin and butcher the animal,
roast its organs on the altar fire, and taste the entrails. Thereafter the
priests consecrate the inedible remains by laying them out “on the
pyre…in just order” and burning the “symbolically reconstituted”
animal. Having offered to the gods a nutritionally valueless gift, the
priests roast or boil the edible portions of the slaughtered animal and
give the participants an equal portion. In sum, the priests engage in
two complementary significations—they sacralize the animal and
then they desacralize it by killing, quartering, and consuming it.

In destroying the value inherent in the sacrificial victim, degrading the low entropy to high
entropy waste, we gain the social cohesion necessary to improve the functioning of the group.
We organize ourselves the way the body organizes itself. Our families, our clades, our ethnic
groups, and our nations have drawn increasing degrees of entropy by means of increasingly
effective technologies of extraction. We gain solidarity through sacrifice. The low entropy of
the environment is literally drawn into our communities to decrease their entropy. That is the
reason that we increase our organization only by reducing the organization of our external
material realities. We must drink in low entropy. Every nation with a strong social organization
depends upon scattering adjacent groups, drawing resources from the environment, and
irreversibly destroying the social solidarity and physical integrity of excluded individuals. We
exist on a gradient, as does all biological life.
The immediacy of sacrificial ritual as it pertains to violent crime has been theorized by
Jack Katz in Seductions of Crime (1988). Katz (1988:13) characterizes his delineation of a
certain variety of lethal violence—one which is shaped by the same cultural logic as more
routine interactions—as “Righteous Slaughter.” Katz bases his analysis on emic cultural studies
and primary accounts. Katz (1988:14) notes that participants in acts of lethal violence often feel
justified, at least partially, in their actions and represent this in their narratives by overt allusions
to overarching cultural themes. It is very difficult to ascertain, and Katz struggles with this,
whether we make appeals to what Katz (1988:18) refers to as the “Good” after the fact only and
then only for the benefit of gaining the potential goodwill of an audience, or if the defense of the
“Good” develops as a primary motivating factor in homicide. It seems an argument can be made
for both and neither, but this uncertainty is probably a crucial dynamic in every case which must
be negotiated subjectively. Perhaps, this is even the function of a jury in a murder trial, to decide
to what degree mens rea reflects the collective motivations of society and to what degree
sanctions must be imposed against the motivations themselves.
The disconnect between mens rea and actus reus is relatively beside Katz’s point,
however, which is focused on one particular question: “What is the essence of the enraged,
unpremeditated homicidal act?” Katz comes to the conclusion that the act is essentially a
restorative sacrifice, a “reconsecration” in Katz’s terms (1988:18). While I cannot accept that
this act is always “nonpredatory” and without premeditation, I must concur with Katz (1988:18)
that we are presented with “sacrificial” behavior. According to Katz (1988:19), rather than being
amoral, “righteous slaughter” is very much a function of morality, even conventional morality.
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Katz (1988:20) also, importantly, notes that in David Luckenbill’s study upon which he bases
several of his conclusions, an audience played an important role in precipitating the homicidal
violence, as did the confrontational behavior of the victim, both of which seem to be as crucial as
the sense of moral offense in developing the situation in which we may expect lethal violence as
a form of ego defense. Katz (1988:21) makes a solid case for the morally motivated homicide
being intensely social and highly “situational,” with a tendency to occur more often in casual
settings which constitute the integral venues of our lives. The most important contributing
factor, according to Katz (1988:22), is that the killer feels no ability to escape the challenge to a
sense of self—or at least to a certain construction of a sense of self.
Inescapability is particularly aggravated in the case of romantic relationships. Katz
(1988:34) suggests that the partner worships what is special about someone to the point where
relinquishing it would be humiliating to an absolute degree. Therefore, no alternative exists in
the mind of the attacker, the individual who makes the sacrifice to the numinous; lethal violence
comes to characterize the sacrificial act whether it was initially intended or not (Katz 1988:34).
Katz (1988:34) characterizes the sacrificial act as a manner in which the attacker may preserve
the relationship past the mortal life of the slain. This is essentially an act centered on the
preservation of an idealized moment against the forces of degradation into high entropy. Katz
(1988:34-35) associates this concept with that of the sovereign’s right to kill in Foucault's
Discipline and Punish (1975/1995). It is, therefore, correct to conclude, as Katz (1983:35) does,
that "[o]verall, the practical project – the concern that organized bloody, righteous behavior – is
the manifestation of respect for the sacred…[i]t is not enough to feel the devotional
spirit…[r]espect has to be objectified in blood."
It is crucial to recall that ancient sacrifice was intended to produce food for the gods;
consumption was at the very heart of the religious ritual in its loftiest sentiments. Occasionally, it
was also the practice to draw blood from the living animal; in this manner we may recognize that
vampirism is an advanced form of cannibalism which draws upon only the essence of the animal
and not for the sustenance of the gods (Katz 1988:35). That the sacred must be reified in blood
is a crucial insight that ties directly into my primary argument because the same sacrificial logic
seems to apply not only to interpersonal situations but also within the realm of governance. For
this project, perhaps, we need not be killed to be sacrificed to the collective; perhaps, being bled
is enough. Both strategies, the ritual slaughter and more restrained vampirism should be
explored for their meaning and intended utility.
Governance may, by extension of interpersonal relationships, be expected to adhere in
some way to similar cultural logics; we may, therefore, assume that we do not seek for patterns
in vain when we search for parallels between the realm of the interpersonal and the realm of
governance. According to Katz (1988:35), Foucault explains to us that the point of torturing the
regicide is to make plain to the populace in a perfectly concrete way an inverse simulacrum of
the harm done to the sovereign. Katz (1988:35) draws an excellent comparison between the laws
of France which stood during the execution of Damiens the regicide and earlier laws which were
based upon sensibilities concerning religious sacrifice which "demonstrated respect for the
sacred.” The influential indigenous American scholar Jack Forbes (1979/2008:121), would
remind us, however, that one constellation of sacrificial violence (i.e. state actor violence) is
answerable with another form in the specter of terrorism (i.e. non-state actor violence).
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The application of the entropy-based sacrificial principle explored above to several
phenomena of criminological importance will serve to illustrate the point of this work, and will
hopefully illuminate these phenomena in a meaningful way. It is my desire to unite disparate
observations into an integrative whole which is comprehensible in its continuity. I will increase
in scope from the smallest scale to the largest in an attempt to demonstrate this principle at every
level for which it possesses criminological importance.
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Part II
A criminology of entropy

Section II.i: The phenomenology of crime and entropy
Katz (1988) theorizes the rationale of seemingly irrational crimes of violence in
Seductions of Crime. It is Katz’s (1988:12) contention that defending the “Good” is key to
understanding the seeming irrationality of murderers. The ambiguously labeled “Good” they
intend to protect is the right of someone like themselves to thrive, receiving expected returns
upon certain levels of entropic investment. That is, if a person donates so much of their limited
time and effort in a given cultural context, they expect a certain culturally specified benefit. If
that return does not present itself often enough and either the means of personal investment or
the techniques of adaptation are exhausted, the individual will feel that the situation is unjust. A
scapegoat will be sought and a sacrifice will be made in order to maintain the real material
existence of the social contract. This is the “Good” to which Katz (1988:12) is referring. There
is no doubt that the outcome of this behavior can present itself as extraordinarily maladaptive.
For example, Presser (2012), in her case study of the mass-shooting perpetrated by Jim
David Adkisson at the Tennessee Valley Unitarian Universalist Church in Knoxville, Tennessee
supports this view by explaining of the logic of the mass murderer: his cultural understanding
makes it imperative to him that society must be defended against the assaults of changing
cultural normativity. The act of mass murder is intended to even the odds for those who
supposedly adhere to the culture with which the murderer identifies by means of the
disproportionality of the act (Presser 2012). The feeling that the ritual pollution of opposing
views and abhorrent actions results in an overwhelming desecration of the society drives the
murderer to purify his community by assigning the ritual pollution a source or a scapegoat and,
then, ritually slaying the chosen target (Presser 2012). It is possible that the terror which ensues
in the wake of such an act is intended to serve as a deterrent to future breaches of the social
contract which would undoubtedly assure further ritual pollution and taboo violation, effectively
rendering life unlivable for people from the cultural group with whom the murderer identifies.
This variety of pollution is supposed to run the risk of calling down the wrath of the numinous in
the form of a heavy, but often unspecified burden for the community to bear.
This understanding of a sacrifice for the community permeates the foundations of
criminal justice. State-sanctioned violence acts as a model for would be-agents of retribution in
defense of society. This is the reason that so often the acts of violence committed by civilians of
this ideology mirrors the modus operandi of the state. When the society is in a state of war, rifles
resembling those employed in that war are likely to be the weapons of choice. The current fad in
purchasing AR-15 rifles, which are designed to look like their automatic military counterparts,
serves as an example. Foucault (1975/1995:207) writes of the “right of the sword” which has
traditionally been a weapon of execution and the enforcement of kingly and noble rights, but is
also a weapon which became the primary dueling implement until battlefield technology saw its
replacement with the pistol. The pistol remains the weapon that represents the primary choice of
civilians intent upon defending the Good in their daily lives, whether legally or illegally. It is,
perhaps, instructive to consider the “justice” meted out by the Islamic State extremists; it has
been enacted by employing fire, a symbol of ritual purification for nearly every culture on earth,
or by employing the sword which has traditionally been a means of righteous execution in the
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Arab world since at least the time of Mohammed. According to Muslim lore, the famous sword
Thulfiqar represented a cherished gift from Mohammed to the Muslim champion Ali,
Mohammed’s own son-in law; Thulfiqar was intended to be a weapon for defense of the faith,
and the legendary sword is still reproduced and copied in the form of wearable talisman charms
to this day, over 13 centuries later. In U.S. culture, the British military practice of execution by
hanging was adopted as the primary form of judicial execution for most of our history as a
nation. The horrifying practice of extra-judicial lynching similarly loosely followed the scene at
the gallows. Even though later electrocution techniques were a bit of a fad following the
increasing use of electricity in the United States for powering our daily conveniences, the trend
of evolution of our theatrics of death continued to evolve. The mind recoils in horror to
contemplate that the implementation of the gas chambers in the United States preceded the
implementation of gas chambers for genocide during the Holocaust by several years.
If crime perpetrated in order to protect the “Good” (Katz 1988:12) may take the form of
judicial punishments, then what role must entropy play in the staging of the dramatic scenes of
these sanctioned executions themselves? In the first part of Discipline and Punish, Foucault
(1975/1995:108-111) analyses the adoption of “the gentle way in punishment” as a preference to
what he later refers to as the “take life or let live” (1976/2003:241) paradigm of monarchical
kingship. According to Foucault (1975/1995), this evolution of both the method of inscribing
judicial power into the body of the victim of execution and the reasoning behind it mirrors the
shift in power from the monarchy to the more bureaucratic style of governance. In both styles of
governance, low entropy is being converted to high entropy, and value is being irreversibly
turned to waste. In one case—that of the swift public execution—the conversion is immediate
and dramatic; in the other case—that of imprisonment or even of decades spent on death row
awaiting an abrupt snuffing out of a life long ago drained of its social meaning—the conversion
occurs slowly and ignominiously.
The bureaucratic way of social and physical killing is a display of the absolute control of
the body of the victim; representing what is truly an attempt on the part of the state to reach the
“soul” of an individual (Foucault 1975/1995:128); the purpose is to keep the criminal as a vivid
trophy, a living, confessing tongue—speaking only to the power of the state—the ultimate act of
recanting from one who once supposedly wished to oppose what the state upheld. The shift is
actually a technological one. By drinking deep the low entropy of the individual in one draught,
the king displays his god-like power, his ability to dramatically spill life upon the ground—to
waste it with reckless abandon. The dramatic public killing which was the restricted province of
the king, his anointed nobility, and their officials was a display of how the rules governing the
common people did not apply to those who occupied the position of exception retained by the
royalty and nobility. More importantly, the display proved a source of social organization—it
was public and reified the king’s laws and the culture of the people, rather viscerally, by
inscribing them into the living flesh of the amputated member of the body politic.
In the case of “the gentle way in punishment” the government strategy had changed
(Foucault 1975/1995:108-111). There was no monarch to drink deep the low entropy of the
individual to provide a figurehead for the social organization of the collective, no power to be
personally amassed by such grievous displays of violence. Rather, under bureaucratic rule, it is
the position held by the individual which determines power—rather than the living body of the
person which serves as the conduit of the divine under monarchical rule. It is unseemly for a
bureaucrat to seem so interested in consuming the life of a fellow citizen. Punishment instead
mirrored the bureaucracy; it was a position to which one could be demoted. The convict was
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meant to occupy the perpetually available social position of the prisoner in order to serve as an
ever present reminder of the power of the state. This power is exercised to drain the low entropy
from the biological body of the individual in order to fuel the social organization of the state and
to generate the necessary waste of low entropy which feeds the internal gradient required by a
modern organically solidary state (Durkheim 1933). Having explored the state’s way of killing,
it is similarly important to delve into the effect of entropy upon the interpersonal aspects of
violent crime, which I discussed in relation to Katz’s premise in the previous section, and to
mine this premise for consistent cultural trends which may illuminate the pervasiveness of our
impetus for violence—Neither the individual, nor the state maintains a monopoly on the
symbolic reception or meaning creation of violence. There is a cultural aspect to be interrogated.
Section II.ii: The ban and the American werewolf
What of the serial killer, the bogeyman of late modernity? He is supposed to be a loner, a
candidate for elevation to high status in the cult of personality. Is he truly a unique case, his
psyche belonging only to the realm of the prison psychologist, or is he (he is almost always a he)
a product of society? It seems too convenient to attribute even the most extreme behaviors
entirely to the uniqueness of the individual. It depends on how this problem is to be resolved,
however; perspective determines how we address it. If the serial murderer is a problem we are
attempting to discuss via the perspective of law enforcement, an enigma to be profiled, tracked
and tagged, commoditized and barcoded like a wolf in a national park, then, perhaps, we have
precluded any understanding of the cultural and social matrix of this individual from the outset.
Due to the relative commonness of the psychological profile of a psychopath or serial killer
(granted these terms are not interchangeable) many false positives are to be expected, and it
seems that past providing for generally available public mental health networks and public
education as to the signs of serious mental disturbance, there is very little that we can undertake
under present circumstances without running the risk of further violating the civil rights of the
citizenry. To further stigmatize the mentally ill as dangerous is morally reprehensible and must
be avoided. To limit civil liberties or encourage witch-hunts by neighborhood watch groups is a
recipe for targeting already socially disenfranchised individuals and groups for more overt
discrimination. Increasing police powers is probably the most dangerous measure to accept in
the culture of what is quickly becoming the world’s most prominent police-state.
What we can do with a relatively positive foreseeable outcome is to seek the thought
process of the individual who feels justified in taking human life for deeply personal reasons in
the cultural imaginary from which this process at least partially arises. Is it possible that this can
occur with no actual meaning being attributable to the acts? Absolutely. In cases, however,
where a motive is attributed and where a meaning is being constructed, even an obscure
meaning, then it seems that seeking the source of both the narrative being constructed and the
source of obfuscation is in the best interests of society and its members because the more deeply
we understand the range of human motivations the more comprehensive our grasp of society
becomes. Furthermore, for practical reasons, understanding the logic of truly dangerous
individuals may enable the rest of us to either spot early warning signs of the dangers they may
pose, or it may help us to circumvent our own contributions to the dangerous narratives which
feed the imaginations of these potentially dangerous individuals.
While individuals may choose to take personal action contrary to all cultural norms and
mores without a sense of resorting to any societal justification, it seems that an individual
possessed of hostile intent may be rendered more dangerous or more likely to engage in
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destructive actions with the encouragement of certain well established justifications for antisocial
behavior. While these are by no means the most prolific or most dangerous criminals—with
state crime proving by far the leading cause of danger to the public and corporate crime proving
a lethal second (Box 1983)—it is crucial for any theoretical exercise to engage the fullest range
of potential applications in order to provide the broadest utility for the social sciences. We are
often so shocked by the details of certain atrocities that broader cultural patterns are often not
considered important due to the gravitas of the violations of norms, values, and most saliently,
the corporeal persons of individuals. Granted, it may be more our distress at the violation of our
concept of bodily wholeness that is the wellspring of horror rather than any true empathy
extended to the victim of violent crime.
Agamben (1998) juxtaposes his Roman homo sacer with the Germanic construct of the
bandit as wolf-man. It is best here to remember that English is a trade language, a pidgin of
Latinate and Germanic components. The English themselves are largely Germanic people and
the culture of England should accordingly be considered of Germanic origins; Agamben
(1998:104-05) traces his bandit to the Scandinavians, Germans, and Anglo-Saxons. If we may
recognize a Roman character to our Neo-Classical political and legal systems and, to some
degree within our language, how much more should we be able to recognize a strong Germanic
origin within the American folk culture which has germinated from Anglo-Saxon and German
cultural seeds?
Every culture develops in a special and divergent manner over time, due to unique
experiences and other forms of dynamic cultural drift. Therefore, these patterns must be
generally read as potential areas for meaning construction and intersectionality—and not
necessarily as clearly delineated categories, more as gestalts which form from patterned nonstochastic similarity rather than an absolute taxonomy. Cosmologies are notoriously plastic and
syncretic as well as reactionary and traditional.
In any case, Agamben’s bandit as wolf is an extremely useful vehicle for conceptualizing
the societal placement of the serial murderer in the Western cosmology—as well as, perhaps,
within the material experience of social life. Agamben (1998:105) situates the bandit as wolf as a
trickster-esque figure whose existence defies the order of both nature and the distinct realm of
civilization. This distinction is crucial to Western conceptions of law and is central to the
cosmology which holds civilization as central to its mythos. Not only does the bandit become
persona non grata and an extreme danger to the wellbeing of individuals, but it most importantly
represents a threat to the perceived order of the cosmos.
What occurs, however, if we assume the perspective of the bandit as werewolf? Labeling
hypotheses in criminology allow us a perspective on the werewolf’s conceptualization of self.
The bandit as wolf exists in both worlds of the dual cosmology, but belongs in neither, what are
the implications for its perception of the cosmos? If the bandit can be killed without committing
murder or even homicide, then may the werewolf also kill those who have ostracized it without
transgression of mores and taboos that do not apply to the individual Agamben (1998:107)
describes as “the sovereign, the werewolf, the wolf-man of man” who “dwells permanently in the
city?” And inside the city is where the “wargus” (Agamben 1998:106) must continue to dwell.
According to Georgescu-Roegen (1971:312-313), the sovereign can live nowhere but at the
center of social life, the urban environment; this is beyond a convenience and is in itself an act of
power. If Agamben (1998:106) is correct and the sovereign is not “given” power but “left”
power to act on others as though they are “bare life,” while denying the agency of others to act
against himself, then the very possibility of hegemony rests solely on this distinction. The power
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of the sovereign is coextensive with the ability to deny the access to and allocation of low
entropy as a form of agency available to the governed; furthermore, the sovereign may allocate
low entropy as desired, even extending to the flesh and blood of the subjects of a ruled domain.
Is it any wonder that the first Roman king suckled at a wolf before slaying his own brother, his
flesh and blood, transmitted the same ferocity bodily from the nourishment of their lupine
surrogate—in order that it should be Romulus himself who should rule as the sole sovereign in
The Eternal City?
The monster (the bandit as werewolf)—who Agamben (1998:106) asserts represents
“from the point of view of sovereignty” the “only…authentically political” life—may be killed
but may not be sacrificed which begs the question, “If it kills one who is a subject of the
sovereign, is the victim necessarily a sacrifice?” In a mandate which seems the pinnacle of
victimology, it is the fiat of society that determines the value of the life of the werewolf;
therefore, is it possible that the very status of inclusion mandates that the life that is killed in an
act constituting homicide, the life which belongs imminently to the sovereign, to society—and
by extension to the deity, to the numinous—must constitute a sacrifice to the deity who is the
rightful owner of that life? How do we speak of victims of crime or wars or of fallen soldiers
and politicians assassinated while instated? Are lives taken by those who were not legitimately
sanctioned to take life stolen? Is this why we officially consecrate the graves of war-dead? Do
we symbolically take back for the state, the society, the family, and the numinous that which was
wrongly taken in an irreparable manner?
Does the serial murderer, who is a product of the same society from which he has been
banned, but from which he nonetheless derives his ontology, sense that not only can the banned
kill without it constituting murder in a certain reversed sense, but also that the life which can be
sacrificed, the life which is taken as though it were bare life, represents a certain mana—a
certain magical potentiality to the same society? By taking or consuming this mana, harm may
be done to the society at large—not only by physically harming it but much more so in the
challenging of its conception of itself and the order to which it belongs. This affront threatens
the hierarchy a society reproduces as a matter intrinsic to its self-perpetuation. Is this the source
of the frustration produced in the families of those killed in crime or in the families of victims of
politically-oriented attacks which result in multiple fatalities? Perhaps, by the cultural logic, the
frustration is born of the fact that a life cannot account for multiple lives or that the “taking of
life” cannot be accounted for in the societal calculus by the destruction of bare life, which is by
fiat and by essence devoid of the mana which figures into this calculus. The werewolf may
never cease to hunger for human lives; however, we are much closer to being sated when the
werewolf is vanquished. The harm done to our shared value system by the possibility of the
existence of the werewolf is, perhaps, the most lasting harm.
It is important to bear witness to how society confronts the aforementioned frustration
resultant from challenges to the legitimated hierarchy and the control, both real and illusory, that
it fosters. We executed Timothy McVeigh by envenomation on a cross in secrecy; this is,
perhaps, an ironic procedure for members of a culture which has largely been inspired by a
religion in which the incarnated God-avatar was sacrificed to redeem humanity by means of
public crucifixion in answer to the fact that the forebears of all humanity were deceived by a
serpent. Symbolic inversions are everywhere a part of the moral standard. In the case of
McVeigh, we could not satisfy those who lost loved ones, because the death of one man cannot
equal the loss to the state and to the families he was able to affect. Were we able to kill one
hundred and sixty-eight McVeighs, would the state have been more satisfied? Or is it the quality
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of the life consumed which must be accounted for in the case of a sacrifice? When the bandit
has become a bandit, is his life rendered immediately insufficient to repay the society for his
offense? Agamben (1998:108) cites Plato’s Republic in which the sacrifice and consumption of
“the blood of [one’s own] tribe” transforms the leader into a “tyrant” and a “wolf.” Is it any
surprise that we attribute similar personality traits to serial murderers and CEO’s? Has much
changed in Western politics since the recording of Platos’s Republic? If the tyrannical leader
and the bandit as werewolf are the only truly political personages (Agamben 1998:106), is it
because politics, and therefore power, is all about the consumption of the blood of the tribe? In a
very corporeal way, both the bandit and the tyrant consume blood, and even though the tyrant
consumes more, often we fear the bandit for his relative unpredictability whereas the tyrant is
categorically predictable; in fact, predictability is the sine qua non of the archetypal tyrant
because the tyrant always instrumentalizes the society itself to indulge in the consumption of the
blood of his own tribe. The very nature of the ban who is also the werewolf is that he is an
invisible friend, neighbor, or family member—present but unknown—until he is eating you!
It is not only Agamben who has theorized this relationship, although his contribution may
be the most eloquent and notable. The French sociologist Denis Duclos (1998) has also
undertaken the theoretical project of describing the relationship we mythologize between the
werewolf and the violent criminal; he, like Agamben (1998) links this conceptual connection to
Germanic ideas of criminal exclusion and condoned structural violence. To Duclos (1998), the
warrior character central to Germanic myth is a figure of central importance; he represents
directed savagery and socially acceptable violence. The problem, according to Duclos (1998),
lies in the mythical status of the character, which can be misappropriated from its original intent
in order to justify antisocial violence. In many way’s Duclos’s analysis of the self-righteousness
of the warrior figure parallels Jack Katz’s analysis of the perpetrator of righteous slaughter in
Seductions of Crime (1988) as analyzed at the end of part one.
Why do we fear the werewolf? What is it about the prospect of being physically
consumed that is so terrifying? According to Dean McCannell (1992), cannibalism is
intrinsically linked to the mechanism that lies behind the taboo. While taboos are not universal in
the manifestations they do tend to occur in all societies; they seem to manifest distinct patterns
which occur across cultures. There can be no hard and fast rules concerning this; however, there
is a tendency to profane that which is linked with basic bodily functions across cultures.
Certainly, Western cultures denigrate many facets of existence which are associated with bodily
functions. The excretory functions are viewed as filthy and degrading. In his Freudian analysis,
McCannell (1992) connects the taboo of cannibalism with our disgust concerning fecal
excretion.
The cannibal is essentially reducing a human being materially to fecal matter in the most
literal possible way. It is, perhaps, easy to see how this can express the fundamental disrespect
for the independent corporeality of another individual. We must also consider that in many
cultures to consume one’s family members is a necessary part of the funeral rites. In this act the
community intends to carry with it – within the bodies of its members – the material existence of
the individual who has died and for whom the funerary rites are performed. This is a
fundamentally different act than exocannibalism which is intended to add insult to the injury of
annihilating another or to more completely extract the other’s mana.
In the case of the family member you would be able to carry the best of one’s personality
with you. In the case of the feared enemy you would be able to incorporate that which rendered
him fearsome. So the two kinds of cannibalism – consuming those from within the group and
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from without the group – are linked by central logic across cultures. That being stated the
motivations are quite different. For our purposes, aggressive cannibalism is central to
understanding the modern world. It is correct to assume that endocannibalism primarily
manifests itself within groups which Durkheim (1933) would refer to as possessing mechanical
solidarity. In the economic understanding of cannibalism lives the desire for people to keep their
economic surpluses primarily within their communities. There are many tropes concerning the
containment of currency within a local economy; in fact, this is a primary concern of many
grassroots community organizations. In this way, people may be attempting to maintain a
tradition of economic endocannibalism, but it is in aggressive economic exocannibalism that we
find the aetiology of the social problems of inequality. McCannell (1992) is very clear in his
perspective that it has become commonplace for one nation to cannibalize other weaker nations.
Section II.iii: On the substance of power
It seems that social power as we commonly understand it in a modern context originated
with the earliest hierarchically organized, stratified societies. These developed during the
Neolithic with the technologies and practices such as agriculture and transhumance pastoralism.
The workforce drove the early flowering of human cultures. To create complex cultures, we
needed an energy source beyond what could be accessed by hunter-gatherer societies. In essence,
we needed technology, and by this I do not mean technology in the form of wheels or tools.
Society itself is the technology. Whether intentional or not, the development of this technology
allowed human beings to create a certain efficiency of action which both necessitated the
complexity of the systems as well as allowed for the growth of self-referential and centripetal
cycles of energy expenditure. The energy that fueled this early process came from a single
source. That source was grain—including the plethora of grains which were the focus of the
agricultural endeavors of the societies which we refer to as early civilizations (e.g. Mesopotamia,
Egypt, the Levant, etc.). Similar strides towards what is referred to as civilization were also
made in China and Southeast Asia as a result of similar process of the domestication of rice. It is
grains which fueled early civilization. These grains led to the development of humanity’s first
resource: person hours. The resource that we began to harness was the amount of work that
people could perform during a given period of time. In fact, humanity’s early alphabets seem to
have been developed as a means of keeping track of commodities such as surplus grain. The
trend seems to be that early societies developed with an economic basis of commodities that are
actually developed from grain (e.g. beer, flour, bread), because grain products served the useful
purpose of allowing people to exist in centers with a greater population density and to be fed in a
stable way as long as sufficient access to fertile alluvial plains could be secured. This likely went
a long way towards supporting and incentivizing early militarization.
What was it about these grasses which could be predictably grown, stored, and
commoditized which led to such great advancements in the progress towards the complexity of
human social systems? These grasses served as vehicles by which the energy of the sun could be
stored and then could be exploited in a managed and organized manner. The advent of the
technology of growing and storing grain provided the potential for central management to be
able to incentivize labor according to a stable and cyclical schedule. Therefore, what likely
developed as a necessary management scheme for showing that enough labor was expended to
provide for next year’s grain stores, soon created the potential for so much surplus energy to be
stored—due to the efficiency of the method—that this energy could be put to uses besides
ensuring the survival of the community.
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This surplus likely allowed for specialization in trades which allowed for the exponential
development of technology and art. Along with the growth in technology and art we, in fact,
may view in the archaeological record, a growing complexity of management often by a protobureaucracy of priests, as well. In this way, the religious function was inextricably tied to
matters of state and to matters of morality in early sedentary agricultural societies. So it is that
we are aware that early human civilization grew rapidly as a result of the ability to store and to
exploit greater energy storage from the sun. Therefore, we can predict that when a new energy
source is developed we should expect to witness a growth in societal complexity commensurate
with the potential energy which can be exploited from the resource.
When we began to develop our potential for exploiting the energy potential inherent in
fossil fuels, we observed a growth commensurate with the degree of energy which could be
efficiently exploited given the technologies of the era. As technologies which allow for fuel to
be efficiently utilized have developed greater efficiency, so we have seen commensurate
advancements in technology and an increase in societal complexity. According to the theory of
metabolic rift (Foster 1999), there is a certain amount of metabolic energy in a given
environment; this energy of course originally comes from the sun and can be stored via various
means – essentially technologies – and then utilized and exploited in various manners depending
upon the necessities of the era. Therefore, when we discuss human social power, perhaps we
should do so in terms of potential energy which can be brought to bear against any given foe or
towards the end of any given project. This is not so different in its primary concept when
compared to resource mobilization theory in political economy, nor is it so different from the
concept of metabolic rift which we encounter in environmental sociology and various other
ecological theories. The problem for sociology is not one of understanding the basic concepts,
which are well known, but in connecting these energetic phenomena and fully appreciating their
implications.
The taboo of cannibalism factors into this economic theory in a particularly pertinent
manner. What is work? From where does the energy to perform this work come? Primarily this
energy comes from the sun and is stored in the form of certain foods, particular grains or grasses.
The same energy can pass through the grains or grasses and be stored in the form of livestock, or
meat, until the time of its consumption. This energy then passes through the human being and is
expended at a certain rate of efficiency determined by the individual’s metabolism. Therefore,
when we speak of human resources, we are discussing a physical force which is the energy of
stored solar power passing through an individual and allowing that individual to perform certain
tasks with greater or lesser efficiency. The intelligence of the individual plays a very practical
and important role in the expenditure of this energy. Furthermore, any technology utilized by
this individual also plays an extremely important role in the efficiency of the use of the stored
solar energy.
To return to our discussion of the early development of human technology we must
consider the advantage provided by the domestication of herd animals. Animals such as the
horse or the ox or the donkey or the dog provided the potential to increase the amount of work
and to specialize the type of work which could be accomplished by individuals in early
agricultural societies. Certainly the advantages, so obvious to us today, must have embodied a
certain mysticism to early individuals – much in the way we manifest high regard for computers
and automobiles today. These animals allowed people to exceed their own limitations and to
increase the potential for meaningful work which could be directed on schedule and, therefore,
represented an advance in technology.
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The social systems intended to manage our animal assistants alone represent an advance
in technology. In every manner we should regard the human relationship with animals as an
advanced social system based on a form of communication and shared understanding of the
benefits of sociality. Furthermore, it is by means of similar behaviors that we have been able to
exploit certain social herd animals and to exploit human beings. Unfortunately, it is likely that
the very same group of tendencies which allow for human beings to be domesticated into their
current state of eusociality also allows for human beings to be made susceptible to atrocities such
as genocide and state violence. The parallel seems somewhat ridiculous until we consider the
docility we have fostered in certain breeds of previously autonomous animals. We can lead cows
to slaughter. In much the same way, the imposition of deception, of controlled food supply, and
the application of certain technologies intended to pacify – and ultimately the imposition of force
or the threat of force – can all culminate in a web of control for both social animals and humans.
What late modern society represents is an improved generation of the technology of control—
based on a scientific understanding of human behavior.
The Holocaust represents the historical point at which we were jolted awake to the reality
of our own domestication—a project which culminates at a point of extreme docility and, by
extension, a universal vulnerability beyond what we previously imagined possible. According to
Richard Wrangham, it was not uncommon in pre-modern small-scale societies for as many as ten
percent (10%) of adult males to be summarily executed for exhibiting extreme violent behavior
(McAuliffe 2010:3). In a Russian experiment conducted with foxes by Dmitri Belyaev, which
began in 1958, it has been proven that domestication can be achieved in a small population of
mammals within a few generations (McAuliffe 2010:3). How much more should we expect a
certain degree of domestication from humans who have been removed from a wild environment
for more than five millennia?
To answer the above question concerning work we must regard it as the amount of
energy which cycles through human being during the course of certain directed activities. A
human being, therefore, possesses nothing besides the expanse of time allotted on earth as
measured in its potential heartbeats. Typically the expanse of time is measured in 120 years or
less. Therefore, the coercion of work represents a theft of heartbeats of the given individual,
which must be equaled by the same measure of compensation as what has been expended. If this
compensation does not symbolically or actually equal the value of heartbeats expended in the
pursuit of this compensation the heartbeats have certainly been stolen from individual. Given
that heartbeats are all an individual has, that the individual will die from overwork or experience
damaged health from labor beyond a certain capacity, and that part of the physical body which
cannot be replaced by means of any compensation is irrevocably lost—coerced labor which does
not equal compensation in kind (human time/energy) represents the most commonplace form of
theft.
To force someone to spend one’s time is to consume the substance of the individual’s
body. The body exists on a temporal spectrum, and the flesh is merely a functional set of storage
materials for the same solar energy which is stored in the grasses and other foodstuffs consumed
by the individual in order to function, metabolize, and to perform work to the end of the survival
of the individual and her or his group. As aforementioned, the material of the body can be
consumed swiftly or can be consumed slowly. If the body’s energies are consumed at a
replenishable rate, then no demonstrable harm is done to the body short of the surrender of
limited heartbeats. If the body’s energies are consumed at a higher rate than the rate at which
they can be replenished, the deterioration becomes observable. This is true in the case of
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starvation and overwork. Psychological work is subject to similar processes as manual labor
although the effects are less noticeable.
The dangers arise when the compensation for the energies expended is strongly
unfavorable for an involved party. This is the beginning of suffering in a capitalist society. This
concept can be expanded. Most individuals in our society have regular bills to pay in order to
maintain their lifestyle. Many of the bills are intended to compensate others for providing some
good or service necessary to the individual’s ability to maintain a certain social class standing.
That is to say, to maintain one’s level of power in society, one’s level of comfort and ability to
affect change in this society, one must be able to provide a certain amount of society’s lifeblood
to others in premeasured doses; it is constantly being drained away. If the input, which must
pass through the individual’s corporal body, does not equal the output, then there will be a
detrimental discrepancy, the less insulated the individual by the system of consumption, the more
noticeable the discrepancy.
Due to the position of the United States as a global hegemon, the individuals living in
what remains of its middle class would have a great deal of power to sacrifice in order to
maintain metabolism, which is the baseline a human must maintain; however, one living in a
peripheral zone would have many fewer items of stored value or services which represent such
value to offer in order to gain the necessary energy to maintain metabolism. There may seem to
be a stark contrast between labor to maintain social status and labor to maintain metabolism, but
the substance of the difference is wrought in the same force, that is the solar energy that passes
through humans and machines in order to generate a certain change in the material world,
represented by a good or service.
Consider your possessions. Are the clothes you are wearing not a physical manifestation
of a process? The cotton was grown, cleaned, brushed, spun, and then woven into a textile
which was shaped by hands and sewing machines according to a template chosen by a design
team and then the product was packaged, shipped, displayed in a store by an employee and the
sold by a cashier in exchange for money which symbolically represented a certain expenditure of
energy on your part. Are not the myriad possessions which surround you manifestations of a
similar process—even the technology which allows me to write this and for you to read it? It is
truly awesome to consider the immense power of modern society and the expenditure of solar
energy in the form of human labor and burned fossil fuels which it represents. Is the drastic
environmental change to the planet and the dramatic growth of the number of humans alive due
to improved agricultural techniques and medical technologies then not all the more explicable
and comprehensible when we consider the massive amount of energy which we may now
harness and channel towards the fulfillment of our designs?
There are other sources of energy and the finitude of a given energy source is not
necessary for the finitude of the span of the human life through which it is channeled to be
appreciable. Consider the case of nuclear energy. Transform it into light, use it in a greenhouse
to grow food for people, and it is a nearly limitless source of energy and, therefore, food; this
energy did not come from the sun and is limited only in as much as supplies of radioactive
material (e.g. uranium, plutonium, thorium) are limited. A similar case can be made for energy
harnessed from geo-thermal vents, etc. This does not mean that for the energy to be made into
economically significant work, it does not have to pass through the human body. But what of
robotics and machines? Until machines make machines without the assistance of human
workers, this conceptualization is applicable, and even then, the energy necessary to have
developed the machines will still represent human corporeality and our mark will be left
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indelibly upon the machines that will doubtlessly replace many forms of human labor in the near
future. Machines represent technologies which amplify human energies and increase human
productivity, but the energies, that is the will to apply the technology according to a plan still
represents directed human actions and, therefore, energies which had to have been channeled
through a human being.
Financialization is the most difficult point in my theoretical framework. Financialization
does in fact represent an expenditure of human energies, but the technology developed in this
case is the technology of convincing other humans as to the validity of the capital being
generated according to certain collective rules and principles, which is no less a technology
which generates an increased ability to do work. The most lucid way for me to explain this is
that the true value of currency only exists in the redemption of a note for actual energy or labor
expenditure. What I mean is that as much theoretical currency as can be generated by the
technology of financial instruments can then theoretically be redeemed for human energy, fossil
fuels, and other means of producing work which reshapes the material world. They are not, and
in many cases cannot be due to the precarious nature of these instruments and the fickle markets
of which they are a part. These markets do allow a certain degree of power-brokering, and
should be regarded in a manner similar to the prestige afforded the men of Yap for owning Yap
coinage. Assets that cannot be moved serve culturally specific functions in maintaining market
relationships, and assets that can be liquidated and are expendable (and are actually spent) do not
differ in their function appreciably from the dollar spent for a beverage. That is to say that
whether a dollar is spent for a beverage or 200 million dollars are spent upon the construction of
a mansion, the principle functions in the same manner. The obfuscation of the system arises in
that many people imagine the money (kept and unspent) of the multi-billionaire or the small
business owner of the corner store to function in the same way, and while to a degree to which
their money is exchanged for work, it does, in the capitalist system, a system in which capital
begets capital, the practical differences render the systems wholly different. To clarify, money is
only redeemable for labor and resources when spent, but its accrual leads to an increase in
prestige which unbalances every social interaction.
Another fallacy is that money is always power. It is not. The legitimated use of violence
decides power. Money is the currency which provides coercive weight to the individual, but if
money or property can be appropriated by the power to offer superior force, the equation
disintegrates. Bill Gates does not decide the fate of the world or of the nation, instead a group of
elites beyond his degree of influence shape its policies and promulgate its most relevant tropes.
The person who whispers in the ear of the person who pulls the trigger controls the world. Bill
Gates is allowed his largely Yap-like wealth as long as he plays by the rules and does not disturb
the real elites. Therefore, we must conclude that it is the coercion of currency acting upon an
individual convinced (often rather correctly) of the power of money which represents its real
power. Consider the place of the Bretton-Woods organization, or of any ruler in the modern
world. We no longer back up our currency with precious metals and even if we did, most of the
precious metals represent an ascribed rather than an intrinsic value anyway; these metals have
value because humans were willing to work for them; just like the intrinsically valueless slips of
cloth we use as their proxies.
The greatest deception of civilization is the value ascribed to currency which is generated
at the cost of materials (cotton blend cloth, ink, and dyes) for the elites who print it, but costs us
the only thing most of us have available to barter, which is our time on earth. Of course, much
of the work ethic which supported the development of this coercive system in which labor has
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always figured centrally, was predicated upon deception. Benjamin Franklin in Poor Richard’s
almanac, as noted by Weber (1905/2002), was a proponent of the central capitalist logic which
separated the Protestant ethic and modern capitalism from the earlier symbolic use of currency;
namely: skillful deployment of capital allowed the capitalist to consume beyond his means by
exploiting other people’s faith in his ability to play markets for a profit. Energy and matter,
however, never materialize from nothing as per the first law of thermodynamics. Therefore, the
myth of capitalism is that to exploit the market to appropriate goods at a low price does not result
in considerable harms to anyone and is contingent merely upon the law of supply and demand.
Allow me to furnish the reader with a new mathematics. Goods and services cost in a standard
unit of human heart beats and associated technological investments and fuel expenditures. The
difference between this (very complex but estimable) figure and the value in this same standard
unit of an exchanged good is essentially the amount of these energies stolen from the investor in
the original goods or services. Markets do not function without power differentials. Power
differentials represent the amount energy which can be taken from one party by another for the
latter’s consumption or symbolic waste. This arrangement is usually contingent upon the latter’s
ability to offer coercive violence or the credible promise of such violence, and it is likely that any
profit should be calibrated against the amount of violence or potential violence which was
necessitated for the entropic differential to be created. In more concrete terms, military and
police expenditures must be weighed against the economic benefits they create.
Acknowledgement of the detrimental effects of markets as they are literally draining
entire populations of their low entropy is the beginning of wisdom. No longer can we pretend
that such damage is purely symbolic, abstract, or ideological. It is physical, concrete, and
empirically demonstrable in the form of differentials in physical and psychological health (which
are linked), resource availability, and potential for social development. Colonialism does not just
represent a theft of mineral and biological resources as we often characterize them, but of human
resources in very corporal sense. Occasionally, this theft has taken the form of actually
transplanting the populations of regions in order for them to be enslaved more conveniently. The
United States has, however, developed systems of debt bondage that do not require the
individuals to be removed bodily form their land; we export slavery.
The United States has developed a more insidious system of economic slavery. In this
system, countries maintain their ostensible autonomy but are economically enslaved from the top
down, often with the United States positioning pliable leaders for their client states. This
strategy, while effective and more approved of in the realm of international public relations than
open enslavement of foreign populations or overt colonialism, has cost countless lives and
embroiled the nation in nearly constant wars across the globe in defense of our precarious
economic and political entanglements which are so necessary for maintaining our waning global
hegemony. As arch-cannibal, the United States has devised a system by which the nation’s elites
may take the best and leave the rest of the goods and services of the entire globe. The problem is
that this arrangement comes at enormous costs for the rest of the world in a very material way.
The power the nation wields assures that the high quality goods in our markets have not been
bought for the equivalent replacement costs of such low entropy; rather, they have been
coercively appropriated at diminished cost due to the immense destructive power the nation has
been able to bring to bear on our neighbors.
Like humans trimming the gristle away from a steak, our modern economic systems have
generated mechanisms to distill products into their most essential forms to gain the most benefit
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from their low entropy. To a degree, this is a matter of efficiency and, to a degree, it is a cultural
performance based on constructs of purity and contamination.
Why buy the slave when you can get the labor for less than the cost of the slave’s
upkeep? Slaves must be fed, and their medical bills paid, they must be housed, and if one dies, a
replacement must be purchased at a high price reflective of the transportation cost to market and
at a handsome profit margin for the slaver, but a worker enslaved by his own government and an
economic system that offers none of these overhead costs to the capitalist is superior if only he
can still be made to work as reliably and productively as the slave. This is where the diffusion of
the American culture of work and consumption has been crucial to the growth and global
development of the American style corporation and the capitalist markets. If a worker is killed,
another, driven by the same ecology of social and market forces as the first who has died, will be
driven to take the position.
A reserve labor force is crucial to the survival of a system of voluntary slavery in which
people must compete to be allowed the privilege of servitude. The key is to allow the market
forces to equally drain all people in the form of rent, a market driven force which can be
manipulated by land enclosure by a capitalist elite, a government, or both. Then, all that is
necessary is for reserves to be kept in prison or on welfare as an example of what happens to
workers who are insufficiently motivated to work (or so the narrative is promulgated). Once this
arrangement is in place, a workforce will willingly sacrifice itself, because the only manner in
which it can survive is to offer to its overlords the lifeblood which they desire, the vessels of
their bodies as machinery to power the development of more complex social systems and more
advanced technologies. The artificial generation of need has been set in motion by land
enclosure which precludes traditional subsistence strategies through the promise of coercive or
violent force. This effect is best produced and easily reproduced by means of societal
atomization, which ideologically and culturally divides people into nuclear families or even
smaller units. Partly, this is due to the desire on the part of governance to be met with no
threatening resistance, as has traditionally been the problem with larger clan structures. Any
subculture with a strong internal ethos that attempts to grow in a modern capitalist nation is met
with allegations of misconduct and uniform suspicion on the part of officials. Not all exploited
laborers and reserved labor pools are treated equally, however. In the next section I will analyze
the inscription of caste into the body politic.
Section II.iv: Entropy and the ghetto
From the Jewish ghettos of Nazi occupied territory in the 1930s and 40s to the still extant
black ghettos of the United States, minorities who are determined to be alien or a threat are
excluded from society by being spatially bounded and socially contained. The purpose of these
ghettos is to provide a place to exclude those who are determined by dominant societal
paradigms not to be worthy of the same access to the low entropy necessary for sustaining either
biological life or continued existence as a social group. If every social organization depends on
an inflow of low entropy, denying the flow in the form of available resources is the primary
means of assuring social dissolution. A society has the power to simply deny the development of
beneficial social bonds by starving a community of resources and by preventing its growth; this
is often achieved by means of preventing the individual agents of such a community from being
able to return with a surplus of goods or services beyond what is necessary for pure survival and
by denying the means of subsistence to be generated or maintained internally. In a spatially
bounded community, the free movement necessary to spread and seek opportunities for
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converting low entropy into high entropy on an individual or family level is denied by simple
containment. In much the same way as imprisonment limits the ability of the individual to seek
opportunities for better food, lodging, and the accumulation of possessions that improve quality
of life, a community imprisoned suffers similar privation. That is why the ability to come and go
and to freely associate must exist as a fundamental human right in a free society. Otherwise,
targeted groups will be strangled by a simple lack of their ability to assimilate available
resources. Of course, the removal of competitors is often viewed as beneficial by others within
the given society, but, unfortunately, it will always result in either social death, that is the death
of what Agamben (1998:1) calls “bios” particularly, or rebellion.
The analogy between a modern society and a biological organism is not a novel concept
within criminology. Notably, Jock Young wrote on the metabolism of society as it pertains to
criminology. In Young’s (1999:56-57) estimation, societies can either be “cannibalistic” or
“bulimic,” but usually share elements of both tendencies. What we are observing in the
cannibalistic behavior of societies is the absorption of low entropy and the conversion of it to
high entropy. Society, in its bulimic aspects, produces waste, literally human beings who have
been drained of their low entropy and denied the ability to further seek sources of it through
processes of discrimination. Certain groups are not biologically predetermined to be abused in
such a manner, but, instead, a societal organization as powerful as any modern trans-industrial
Western nation has the power to decide which characteristics it will target in order to establish
criteria for discrimination. Horkheimer and Adorno (1947/2002:165-172) address this in their
Dialectic of Enlightenment in relation to the Jewish people; the authors’ evaluation of the
situation is that the state has so removed the ability of individuals to establish their own
difference that the only way in which a group can be targeted is by politically-assigned
differentiating attributes. This is similar to Agamben’s (1998:185) estimation of the forces at
work in the Second World War death camps on individuals who came to be cruelly labeled (in an
act of morbid humor at death’s door) “der Muselmann.” The intended objectification is
systematic. The individual bears no responsibility for the ultimate effects of the objectifying
forces leveled by a weaponized social situation.
Young (1999) agrees with Horkheimer and Adorno and with Agamben in his estimation
of the project of generating social exclusion. Young (1999:107) specifically analyzes systemic
discrimination in relation to the Jewish people and black Americans. Young’s (1999:107)
“critique of essentialism” (whether genetic or cultural) is that it cannot possibly encompass the
dynamism of human behavior. Young (1999:109) turns to Zygmunt Bauman for an explanation
of the progression of our new “cultural essentialism” from earlier ideas of “biological
essentialism;” Young’s exasperation with the problem is notable in his assertion that through the
alteration of the discourse, divisive narratives have been maintained and rejuvenated. The
problem of the “blank slate” hypothesis (Walsh 2009:8) is, in this regard, not unique, but a
question of intentionality; the “blank slate” hypothesis is not, ultimately protective against the
sort of destructive exclusion that, in the previous century, was employed to support eugenics.
Intentionality, the aspect of human behavior discerned with the most difficulty, then becomes
central when it is obvious that a supposedly improved narrative can be put to the same
deleterious purposes as its predecessor. Young (1999:110) concludes his discussion of
essentialism by reminding us that our efforts at expanding the inclusivity of society by means of
a platitudinous “multiculturalism” are failing due to the ease of cooptation of such messages by
those who would see “multiculturalism” put to the purpose of divisiveness. Walsh answers the
dangers of employing biological explanations in sociology in line with Young’s criticisms;
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Walsh (2009:9) quotes Bryan Vila as stating that “‘biological findings can be used for racist or
eugenic ends only if we allow perpetuation of the ignorance that underpins these arguments.’”
By whatever justificatory narrative, the effects of racialized exclusion are horrific in their
consequences. Agamben (1998:166) asserts of the Nazi concentration camps that “[t]he camp is
merely the place in which the most absolute conditio inhumana that has ever existed on earth
was realized…” Agamben (1998:166) recalls that the Nazi camps were not the first of their
kind—citing similar camps constructed by “the Spanish in Cuba in 1896,” and by the English to
pacify the Boers—but represent the ultimate typifying example in the popular consciousness due
to their vast capacity and their extreme intention of destroying an entire race, culture, language,
history, religion, and ethnicity. Agamben’s (1998:168) contention is that the increasing
normativity of the political and legal “state of exception”—of which the camps are a symptom—
is reflective of our broader modern social experience. In the paradox of “the state of exception,”
the obfuscation of our legal justifications sufficiently unravels to witness a glimpse of the
intentionality behind the order of modern societies (Agamben 1998:168). This is the nascence of
the “space of exception” which, according to Agamben (1998:169), became quite “permanent” in
Nazi Germany.
The “space of exception” in the United States has existed within the person of the black
American for centuries. The racial caste system in the United States assures that the camp is
carried within the individual, and as much as the law and the Furor are said by Agamben
(1998:184) to be united, we witness a commensurate attachment of the idea of the ghetto to the
black American. Why would “white flight” occur were we not dealing in the realm of the
numinous and metaphysical? Were a neighborhood not previously a ghetto, why would the
presence of black Americans ritually transform the location? Taboo violation is beyond rational
thought, and those who have been cast in the role of the contaminators represent the camp in
their personages and form it wherever they congregate, according to the cultural logic. This state
of American caste taboos, while more ritualized due to long practice, arises as a cultural reaction
to the sublimated guilt of the economic arrangement of slavery and in reaction to the
economically subordinated position that black Americans still occupy.
Loic Wacquant (2000/2011:274) explicates that it is the very project of “extraction” of
unpaid or undercompensated labor that constituted the original impetus for creating the
renovated Jim Crow constellation which comprises the modern ghetto and the modern prison.
This arrangement represents another link in the chain of the oppression of the black community
reaching back to the centuries of plantation slavery in the New World. According to Wacquant
(2000/2011:274), it was the shift to the service sector economy and the decision to outsource
jobs as part of the policy of Globalization that led to the black community being targeted by the
increased “‘law-and-order’” racial containment strategy in lieu of the more overt prior systems of
segregation enforcement. The black community could only gain political rights in times of
necessity during which the white community needed the reserve labor pool to be mobilized;
Wacquant (2000/2011:274) references the wartime necessities of maintaining our military
presence in Vietnam. Under our current system of mass incarceration, the reserve labor pool is
maintained for economic and for cultural meaning creation (i.e. the black community is similar
to the prisoner who is a symbol of society’s collective power under “the gentle way of
punishment” [Foucault 1975/1995:111-116]). According to Wacquant (2000/2011:275), by
comparing Jewish and black American ghettoes, we can arrive at the conclusion that the ghetto is
“essentially a sociospatial device that enables a dominant status group in an urban setting
simultaneously to ostracize and exploit a subordinate group endowed with negative symbolic
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capital, that is, an incarnate property perceived to make its contact degrading…” Wacquant
(2000/2011:276) builds upon this definition by describing the modern prison as a “judicial
ghetto.”
In Prisons of Poverty, Wacquant (2009) analyzes the effects of intensified penality
resultant from a complex array of factors in the era of the ascendancy of Neoliberalism. The
picture Wacquant (2009) so vividly paints in so much detail is one of a high degree of
organization to the project of segregating and regulating the poor and ethnic minorities in the
United States. According to Kimball’s (2007) characterization of the evolutionary advantages of
an increased energy dispersal, which in turn leads to improved internal organization, this trend of
the reification of the worst aspects of the criminal justice system may be exactly what we should
expect. That is not to suggest this is the only path, and Wacquant (2009:130-31) somewhat
sentimentally, somewhat pragmatically, opines that Europe need not follow in the footsteps of
the United States in regards to an increasingly rigid Neoliberal penalty. If the economic
tendencies of entropic exchange can be predicted by the American model, then Europe may
expect the expedient course of action to resemble that which was undertaken these past decades
in the United States; however, an understanding of the dangers of this is precisely what
Wacquant (2009) is attempting to publicize in order that this particular evolution of European
society might be obviated. The extreme results of segregation along racial caste lines, a situation
all too familiar to Europeans during the last century, will be the subject of the next section.
Section II.v: Entropy and genocide
According to Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009:36), Sheldon Glueck, himself “a
Jewish immigrant from Europe,” was criminology’s first scholar of genocide in the immediate
aftermath of the Holocaust. Otherwise, until recently criminology has largely ignored what
Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009:31) refer to as “the crime of crimes.” It is Hagan and
Rymond-Richmond’s (2009:35-36) contention that this is likely due to uncomfortable truths
about the history of genocide in the United States and the context of racism against indigenous
peoples which has characterized the European—and particularly the British—diasporas.
Although Glueck was active for only a short while, his scholarship proved “‘essential to the
Nuremburg Trial,’” in the words of Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, “who headed the
American prosecution team [during the Nuremburg Trial]” (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond
2009:37).
Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009) highlight two aspects of genocide which are
particularly pertinent to themes of sacrifice/destruction of value and entropy. The economic
aspect of the genocide in Darfur is addressed by Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009). The
other topic is that of the employment of the incantation in order to sanctify sacrificial violence
and direct its effects. These two aspects of genocide are central for linking the phenomenon to
the entropic economy.
The simplest link is the link between economy and entropy already established; genocide
possesses a certain innate economic character. Genocide is a calculated practice intended to
erase people considered competition for resources—and thus low entropy; furthermore, genocide
can include, as a portion of the legal disenfranchisement of the target population, the theft of
property or labor (frequently resulting in over-work, failing health, and death). Hagan and
Rymond-Richmond (2009) present an in-depth analysis of the economic impetus for genocide in
Darfur; according to the researchers, theft of land and livestock is a primary motivation for
genocide in western Sudan. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009:23-27) remind us that while
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we do not often fight over livestock, as it is the primary form of wealth in Sudan, the possession
of livestock is not only a motivating factor for conflict, but also directly tied to social status in
Sudanese society. According to Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009:27) the theft of livestock
has resulted in a multimillion dollar black market trade. We, however, living in the United
States, need not look any further for the economic benefits of genocide than the soil under our
feet.
The economic wealth of the United States could not have been possible without manifest
destiny—the supposedly divine justification of expansion by Euro-Americans across the North
American continent and the coextensive displacement of indigenous Americans. In Mein Kampf,
Adolf Hitler (1925/1999) makes it clear that he intended to depopulate Eastern Europe (Poland
and Ukraine seemed particularly important targets) in order to emulate the United States’
example and to approximate its resource base. The differences between the genocidal campaigns
was the level of technological innovation, social control, and the rate of completion of the
projects involved. In Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler (1925/1999) illustrates very clearly that a
primary goal of his genocidal policies against Jewish Europeans, Slavic peoples, the Poles (and a
considerable list of other political, religious and ethnic groups which he believed worthy only of
extermination) was to capture lebensraum for those he considered the deserving German volk
(Hitler 1925/1999:644-646). This land was to be depopulated and then colonized through the
course of a state-authorized expansionist policy. Hitler, in his writings and speeches, was able to
construct, through cultural symbolism, what Durkheim terms a measure of mechanical solidarity,
out of an organically solidary Germany (Durkheim 1933).
Hitler was engaging in a practice commonly observed in the fomentation of a genocide.
A similar cultural construction was developed by Slobodan Milosevic regarding the Serbs
(Gordy 1999, Longinovic 2011). Hitler, of course, was not of elite status early in his career, but
through political maneuvering was able to ascend to such a status before becoming influential
enough to implement his genocidal policies which included the tactics of extermination,
displacement, and enslavement. The elite group needs only to develop a propaganda message
based on notions of a broad Durkheimian (1933) mechanical solidarity, one which disregards and
ideologically levels the innate disparities of a society based upon Durkheimian (1933) organic
solidarity—a category which includes all modern societies. In effect, the elites need only to
ideologically obfuscate the complexity and dynamism of the organically solidary modern society
in order to develop an esprit de corps characterized by the primordial sense of belonging of the
mechanically solidary social unit. This resembles a form of “totemism” (Durkheim 1915:88-97),
which obviously features, in modern incarnations, totems such as the nation-state as delineated
by current, previous, or ideal political boundaries, the flag representing a grossly reductionist
concept of the national ethos, or a “racial” or ethnic group—often but not always a majority—
which is judged in the cultural imaginary to constitute the traditional and rightful claimants to the
position of stewardship of the nation-state.
Of course, the arbitrary decision of the elites cannot be the sole contributing factor to the
fomentation of a genocide. A necessary precondition is the persecution of the genocidal
population. This population can have been persecuted by the targeted group, or the targeted
group could have merely been assigned blame based on perceived wrongs, as is certainly the
case during the Nazi genocide of the Jewish peoples of Europe. This lack of responsibility for
perceived offences is prominently illustrated by the perpetual disenfranchisement of the Jewish
peoples of Europe for centuries.
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Groups selected as targets of genocidal violence have not always been in positions of
perpetual disenfranchisement, however. Several notable genocides have targeted previously
hostile groups, or, that is, people who have been deemed the adherents to a tradition which was
held responsible for persecutions of the past. Consider the case of the Serbs suffering from the
genocidal depredations of the Croats during the Second World War or the case of the Tutsis who
held a superior social and economic position in relation to the Hutus during the colonial period in
Rwanda.
In the case of Germany preceding the Second World War, Hitler exploited German
xenophobia—largely resulting from the punitive terms of the Treaty of Versailles (Hitler
1925/1999)—to target all groups, foreign and domestic, which could be construed as alien to the
mechanical solidarity which he wished to foster among the inhabitants of his Third Reich. It
should be noted that “fear mongering” among the group, against the values and the perceived
viability of the group, is a key feature of the propaganda intended to exploit tumultuous times in
a manner that allows for the ideology of a patently false formation of pseudo-mechanical
solidarity to be entrenched by interested elites. Consider this passage from Mein Kampf (Hitler
1925/1999:646):
Then, without consideration of ‘traditions’ and prejudices, it must
find the courage to gather our people and the strength for advance
along the road that will lead this people from its present restricted
living space to new lands and soil, and hence also free it from the
danger of vanishing from the earth or of serving others as a slave
nation. The national socialist movement must strive to eliminate
the disproportion between our population and our area – viewing
this latter as a source of food as well as a basis for power politics –
between our historical past and the hopelessness of our present
impotence.
The project of drawing entropy from an entire segment of society is very much akin to the
project of individual sacrifice, but requires more social organization in order to achieve
imprimis. Once this critical mass of population density and social organization is reached, the
society is fully able to be weaponized into the most sophisticated technology of destruction
known to humankind. The genocidal society can do more damage in a short period of time than
any weapon short of a barrage of nuclear armaments. The reason we witness genocide employed
when the nuclear armaments are not, is because the sophistication of such an organized society
leads to a high degree of precision in targeting the individuals deemed to be deserving of having
this weapon leveled at them.
This interpretation would certainly be readily reconcilable with Foucault's
(1976/2003:259-60) conception of the coextensive exposure to death which the citizenry must
endure in order for it to be purified to a transcendent degree. Katz (1988:33) states "[s]acrificial
violence does not particularly seek the neat end of death; rather it attempts to achieve the
existentially impossible goal of obliteration, of annihilating or wiping out the victim." This is
particularly pertinent when one considers violence such as what we may observe in genocide. If
the genocidaire's intention is not to kill but to obliterate what the victim represents to the
genocidaire, then our focus as researchers must fall upon the genocidaire's interpretation of the
victim. This does not mean that we should allow the genocidaire to define the victim's
experience, but rather that we should seek the meaning of the act committed by the perpetrators
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in obvious symbols of the appropriate cultural provenience rather than in any real or perceived
wrong perpetrated by the victims.
Genocide is an extreme example of power relations, and, therefore, we must study it from
the top down if we are to make sense of what occurs. This very much accords with the act of
cannibalism essentially representing the consumption of the life force of those who are killed in
acts of sacrificial violence. It is not necessary for the flesh of the individuals to be corporeally
consumed; rather, as in this case, the bodies are symbolically wasted. We must consider,
however, that waste is a form of consumption. Although it may seem counterintuitive, as in the
concept of the sacred or taboo, it seems that we have a paradox; for value to exist it must bear
witness to its opposite. This is a crucial construction when we consider that this principle applies
to humanity; the subject of the sovereign is equally another consumable resource. For us to
understand what it is to be a valuable human, we must understand what it is to not be a valuable
human by bearing witness to acts of Othering or exclusion. Could it, therefore, be that genocide
represents to those committing the genocide the creation of value (social solidarity) and the
creation of waste (the destruction of other communities and their members) at a fundamental
level? But how is the weapon aimed?
In order to inscribe the will into the sacrificial victim, which is ultimately the purpose of
sacrifice, incantations must be employed. In this case, the vitriolic narrative is inscribed by
means of hate speech intended to exclude the target of the genocidal act. Katz (1988:36) asserts
that "[i]n the details of the assault the project of sacrificial violence re-creates the truth of events
received." This does not mean, according to Katz (1988:36), that the acts must seem to correlate
to the sensibilities of the outside observer. Katz (1988:36) continues that, through cursing, those
committing sacrificial violence have sought to profane the victim of an attack by means of
"casting a spell or invoking magical forces to effect degrading transformations in a polluting
offender." Katz (1988) notes that the sacerdotal offender seems to create little distinction
between the two forms: that is the sacrifice of a valuable other and the destruction of the one
who is profaned.
The common ground between Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s (2009) analysis of the
genocide in Darfur and Theidon’s (2013) analysis of the genocidal violence employed against
the indigenous Peruvians by Shining Path is the high profile of the transformative incantation as
a feature of ritual rape. Katz (1988:36-38) explains the ritual power of the incantation in the
context of sacrificial violence; the sacrificial priest seeks to right past wrongs by means of
transforming the agent guilty of the wrong or a scapegoat chosen as representing the agent of that
wrong. In either case, the word transforms the purpose of the flesh before or as the flesh itself is
transformed. We receive exactly the same impression of the inscription of sacrificial violence
into not only the individual, but also the community in the form of the hate speech of
genocidaires.
Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009:119) reference Matsueda on the components of the
organization of a social group capable of maintaining a social movement; these include the
characteristics of shared definitions, an established criteria for inclusion and exclusion in the
group, and the vilification of the Other. This organization itself is a form of low entropy, a social
group metabolic process that must be generated and maintained by means of the extraction of
energy and low entropy from external sources. The source in the case of the genocidaires in
Darfur is the social cohesion of groups targeted for destruction by means of rape, terrorism,
displacement, and mass murder. The incantation is an indication that this is sacrificial violence
as theorized by Katz (1988). Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009:20-23, 132-133) explain that
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“racial epithets” were employed in conjunction with the genocidal campaign against the resident
population of Darfur targeted by the Janjaweed for rape and extermination; terms like “slave”
were employed to dehumanize the largely helpless civilians displaced, raped, tortured, and
slaughtered by the Janjaweed who employed a mixture of modern and ancient military tactics to
terrorize and kill the target populations at the behest of the Sudanese government.
Theidon (2013) recounts the blood chilling stories of the indigenous Peruvians who were
targeted for campaigns of terror and extermination by Shining Path; in a manner similar to the
Janjaweed, guerillas employed the transformative power of racial epithets in conjunction with
the material harms they visited upon the Peruvian people. The point of the genocidal exercise is
to generate an improved social organization for the belligerent group by means of draining the
social organization of the targeted group. Nowhere is this more obvious and chilling in
Theidon’s (2013:131-33) account of her fieldwork in Peru than in the stories of the
dehumanizing and confusing racial epithets that were shouted at women who were being
violently and ritually gang raped by militants. Theidon (2013:133-36) asserts that racial
categories are themselves reconstituted by the ritual cursing used to render the gang rapes a sort
of public performance or odiously brutal sacrifice. Through engaging in incantations and
observing racial hierarchies in the order of men engaging in the rapes, men of lower racial
categorization can seek to at once normalize the racial hierarchy and also to access the power of
the racial groups considered to be superior by means of distancing themselves by invoking racial
epithets that could be applied to their own racial category (Theidon 2013:133-36). In short,
othering is enacted by means of committing the sacrificial violence of gang rape while chanting
the ritual incantation of such a sacrifice; only in this way can the group of rapists seek to deprive
the targeted race or class of organization and absorb the lost organization as their own. The
rapists violate more than the women they rape, they prove that the men must flee their homes in
order to survive, allowing the women to suffer the depredations of the rapists; the social contract
is obstructed, betrayed and in its place, a sort of perverse wasting of the social organization
contributes to the increased solidarity of the rapists. This principle concerning war rape is
generalizable. In violating the women’s persons, the rapists pervert the social arrangement that
is reified through traditional gender relations and marriages. The narrative of the society is
violently inverted and inscribed into the flesh of the women as well as into the social life of the
village. The violation is as complete as it is inexcusable; however, the resilience of the women
and desire to reconstitute village life is remarkable—as is the courage of the women to send their
men away to save their lives, when the men would have proved a comfort, even if a “symbolic”
one (Theidon 2013:127-28).
The violation of rape depends on the act of taking a part of the bodily integrity of the
individual against the will of that person; the act when, it is committed against women, is a
sometimes symbolic and sometimes very real appropriation of the female body’s ability to
generate new life from within. The rapist is a hijacker of the female reproductive ability,
whether in real or symbolic terms. In a sense, all genocide is a violation of the group’s integrity
as well as its ability to self-replicate and perpetuate its culture and values. Rape is a potent
symbol of this and is also an effective tool aimed at the material dissolution of a group, even at a
genetic level. The potency of genocide as a weapon is largely dependent on the fact that any
population can be weaponized, given certain structural and cultural conditions, in a manner that
will render the people of that population, primarily the men, into dangerous weapons for
dissolving the solidarity of opposing groups.
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As far as weapons of war are concerned, genocide and similar ethnocidal violence may
be among our most destructive. We cannot yet employ nuclear arms in a manner that supports
the project of society in a sustainable manner (apart from in their deterrent and bargaining
functions), but the mere possession of them by the United States and the Soviet Union during the
Cold War provided the leverage necessary to enforce a stalemate which allowed the two
industrial Superpowers to threaten and coerce the rest of the world—the third world—into
surrendering the low-entropy sources the Superpowers required to continue their rapid growth.
These resources included the populations of the third world who could be exploited as a source
of labor, the low entropy of the bodies of the workers serving as fodder for the war machines of
the two great empires.
During this era of upheaval, merely the necessary culmination of the period of
colonialization, which resulted in the United States emerging as the last superpower, those who
had not been exposed to the genocidal experience of the era of imperialism were reached by the
exploitation and small-scale total wars which transpired as the tensions between the superpowers
during the Cold War warmed. We are now living in a global society which has been exposed, as
Foucault (1976/2003), explains in his discussion of genocide and Nazism, to the supposedly
purifying element of death. When the logic of Westernized, industrialized total war has become
viral in every disenfranchised corner of the world, the result is that sometimes local governments
employ genocide—a tactic which is the culmination of the technologies and rationale of this
form of total war—in order to gain the coveted power to which they are subjected by the
oppression of nations which, due to their geographic location, access to technology, and social
histories, have developed a superior ability to leverage the power which is entropic conversion.
Jack Forbes (1979/2008:61) summarizes this succinctly: “[violent exploitation] spreads partly by
resistance to it.”
Section II.vi: The camps: to what ends?
The basis for Agamben’s (1998:166-180) theory of “the Camp as Nomos” is to be found
in the Nazi concentration camps of the Second World War. There is, however, an important
aspect of the concentration camps of the Hitler’s Third Reich which has been unfortunately
under-emphasized in order to focus on the inexcusable nature of the penal practices and the
agenda of extermination of those deemed undesirable elements of society in the German
occupied territories—primarily the Jews, Roma, Soviet prisoners, known homosexuals, the
physically or mentally differently abled and religious minorities such as the Jehovah’s witnesses.
I do not hope to in any way excuse National Socialist policies nor do I intend to minimalize
either the genocide perpetrated against the Jewish people or the extermination of other targeted
groups. I intend to contextualize this genocide as within the broader schemes of nation-building
and consolidation during the era. While the crimes of the Nazis are inexcusable, the ends they
pursued remain comprehensible.
The purpose of the genocidal policies was a combination of a desire for territorial
acquisition and the imperial expansion of national borders in tandem with a use for and will to
acquire a slave labor force. Hitler was a student of US extermination and internment policies
which were designed to be utilized against indigenous Americans as a mechanism by which
Manifest Destiny could be realized in the American Heartland and throughout the American
West. Our own policies, although begun in the wake of the epidemic pathogens unintentionally
deposited on these shores by the first Spanish explorers, became programmatic as early as the
Plymouth settlement in New England and their intentional destruction of their indigenous
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neighbors. It is my contention that in all possibility, our treatment of the indigenous Americans
may have even more closely paralleled the treatment of various elements of society, especially
the Jewish people, than it did historically, were the technologies available to the Nazis in the
1940s available to the United States in the 1830s. We did perpetrate death marches, marked by
privation and exposure, leading to extermination of vast numbers of indigenous Americans
throughout the 19th century, and we did utilize known biological agents to break resistance. We
also engaged in campaigns of rape, overt systematic violence, relocation by various
conveyances, and rationing in internment camps that led to starvation.
Our own program was clearly the removal of any indigenous American presence which
threatened complete Euro-American acquisition of valuable land on the continent. With the
massive influx of displaced or disenfranchised European laborers, as well as the prevalence of
captured foreign or domestically born slaves of West African heritage, indigenous Americans
were not judged to be necessary for their extractable labor. Therefore, the indigenous
populations—with their flourishing traditional cultures as a unifying feature and their effective
subsistence strategies which allowed for survival without complete dependence on state
regulatory mechanisms— were judged to be more of a liability to the burgeoning state than a
potentially beneficial component for assimilation and extraction of labor. The risks out-weighed
the benefits, so indigenous Americans, like indigenous Australians, some indigenous Africans,
and indigenous New Zealanders, amongst others scattered across the former Western Empires,
were docketed for pacification and destruction. There is no reason to assume that the plans of
Hitler’s Nazi Reich were qualitatively different than these programs, although it may be argued
that the difference lay in the completeness admittedly intended in the policies to eradicate the
Jewish people. To this argument I can only ask for a definition of complete destruction when the
subject is the eradication of a culture. For all intents and purposes, the United States has
completely destroyed indigenous American lifeways through the availability of alcohol,
enclosure of lands, destruction of traditional food supplies, and legal prohibition of meaningful
resistance practices, with only a few token traditional practices maintained on government
license.
It has oft been stated that the uniqueness of what the Jewish diaspora refers to as the
“Shoah,” or “the catastrophe,” was that it was targeted at destroying a way of life and a culture,
down to its history and traditions, not merely the lives of the transmitters of the culture, but to
this I must respond by questioning whether indigenous Americans can be counted as transmitting
their traditional culture if they may do so only under the strictures of Federal permissibility. The
sine qua non of indigenous American nationality was always sovereignty, and without
sovereignty can the indigenous Americans be said to maintain their nationality upon which their
traditional cultural practices and subsistence patterns must be contingent? It is in this vein of
inquisition that I must draw the parallel to the value the state of Israel represents to the Jewish
people, as the state represents a substantive opportunity to maintain a Jewish sovereign
nationality in a meaningful sense and to, thereby, reacquire the right and ability to transmit
culture in as a sovereign, self-determined agentive body—a juridical person of sorts on the
international stage.
It is this linkage between self-determination and sovereignty within an arbitrary, yet
practicably meaningful, cosmology of nation-state agentive bodies, to which Agamben directs
us. The primary philosophical question for our era must be that if Agamben (1998) and Arendt
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(1976) are correct, that if in the moment of the birth of human rights, they were forever lost to
modern societies and that the world has become a camp of stateless individuals without any
substantive defenses against rights violations, then is it also the case that the valuable possession
of the Jewish state has been allowed to be realized by its Western architects at precisely the
moment it could no longer pose the threat to international hegemony of offering a real dissenting
voice based on its ability as a sovereign to self-determine and to transmit its cultural traditions?
Is Israel a puppet state for the West, a bastion of control in an inhospitable land, as the Kingdom
of Jerusalem was before the ultimate Muslim victory at the conclusion of the Crusades? In this
manner, is it beyond reason to compare the value of the state of Israel as a sovereign body and
the previously stateless existence of European Jews with the case of indigenous Americans? If
the reservations moved beyond their status as prison camps would statehood guarantee even a
modicum of sovereignty in our intensively globalized world? I believe Agamben (1998)
strongly affirms the negative. If sovereignty has become a lie, to what use may this lie be put and
to which liars is it useful, as utility must be the measure of all things in a rationalized world?
The answer seems to be the nation-state’s ability to induce large numbers of people, tribal
creatures that we are even at a biological level, to willingly serve certain aspects of an
international agenda. In this way, even the most powerful states are brought to heel as
mechanisms of a global project of civilization and progress. To what use, however, are we to be
put?
It is my hypothesis that the program of all modern states is contingent upon the
acquisition of slave labor. The logic of society is extraction, accumulation, and redistribution/reappropriation of all value that can be commoditized, however abstractly or creatively. Slave
labor is ideal for any modern state which operates on the capitalist conceptualization of always
gaining more for less. It is the most basic and apparent market principle. Unfortunately, there is
forever someone who must accept less in order for these schemes to operate. Slavery is ideal for
the system in that the slave is offered only enough of value to keep him or her laboring
(Hornborg 2011:38). The equation is highly rational at the level of a cost-benefit analysis as
long as the productive capacity of the slave is more systemically valuable than the input
maintenance. There is a minimum operative investment of value to keep the slave sustained and
functioning, past this all value must pass to the entity enforcing the enslavement.
All labor schemes operate on this very simple principle and wages are simply calibrated
based on the amount of force and the effectiveness of said force which need be brought to bear to
ensure enslavement. It is obvious from plantation slavery in the Americas, sex slavery in Arabia
and elsewhere, as well as from the slave labor to which National Socialist state-internees were
subjected that humans can and, often, will be forced to labor for nothing more than mere
survival, in a state Agamben (1998:4) has usefully termed “bare-life.” Even this state has limits,
natural or cultural thresholds at which humans will no longer psychologically or physically
respond to coercion; this is manifested in the person of the ultimate product of slavery, or the
“Muselmann,” as Agamben (1998:185) tells us. It has, therefore, become obvious to the
overlords throughout history, that it is beneficial to input enough value into your labor force to
keep the laborers willing and able to continue productive work. That is these persons have been,
through a combination of bribery and coercion—sometimes through open and certain/immediate
use of lethal violence—driven into a self-extractive mechanism. That is, societal labor schemes
have been carefully calibrated to either cause people to literally beg for their opportunity to
extract their own valuable labor to the benefit of others who maintain a superior hierarchical
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position in a pyramidal design, as is the current situation, or they have been threatened with the
end of their own mortal existence, or the damage or destruction of their corporal body, or those
bodies of their close associates, in order to assure a reliable, minable, available labor force. The
permutations of this basic logic have been as varied as their historical contexts, but the logic is
essentially unchanging. The importance of understanding Nazi concentration camps as not
purely efforts at bringing about maniacal evil but as essentially an economic program ordered on
the same logic as all other modern economic programs is crucial for the proper appreciation of
the broader meaning of the camps.
Section II.vii: The generation of high entropy
The creation and destruction of value are not entirely rational. This is in keeping with
Georgescu-Roegen’s (1971:284) assertions concerning the importance of the “flux of life
enjoyment” which must be central to any economic theory and represents the juncture between
the entropic conversion of material reality and the value we derive from converting that reality.
Frow (2003:25) cites two traditions concerning “nonutilitarian expenditure:” one based upon
“functionalism” of Thorsten Veblen or the “social differentiation” explanation of Pierre
Bourdieu—one based in the “antifunctionalist theories” of George Bataille and Jean Baudrillard.
Frow states that he intends to center a theory more on the functionalist strain of thought due to
the incomplete ability of the latter thinkers to convince him of the lack of a “function” for waste
and waste-producing behaviors in society. I tend to agree with Frow, particularly on the point of
Baudrillard’s theory’s incompatibility with the project at hand. Frow emphasizes the centrality of
consumption and consumerism to any explanation of the economy of value in our society. I
must agree that a somewhat—if not strictly functionalist approach—is key to understanding the
relationship between modern people and the creation and destruction of value.
Frow (2003:26), again citing Veblen—specifically The Theory of the Leisure Class
(1899)—draws a distinction between what has traditionally been considered “women’s work
(productive work)” and “men’s work (unproductive).” In this distinction, Frow (2003:26)
emphasizes Veblen’s line of demarcation between the two classes of work—namely,
“exploit[ation].” As Veblen theorized, and Frow (2003:26) concurs, the distinction between
using an object in an “industrial activity” and “coercing” a person to serve a similar function are
received differently in the popular imagination. Nonetheless, these are technologies which
include not only those techniques which allow a person to coerce another person to work as a
piece of industrial equipment, but the techniques of blinding most people to the fact, or ensuring
their complicity should clarity concerning the situation dawn upon them. Frow (2003:26)
continues that there tends to be a snowball effect when wealth inequality from simple
exploitation reaches the level at which it can be more or less stably maintained and passed down
as inheritance—according to Frow who cites Veblen, this increases the prestige of the wealth
holder in se.
The portion of Frow’s piece which holds so much significance for this project is the idea
that, more than in the pursuit of material needs or material functionality in a conventional sense,
wealth is sought for the ability to waste it in order to increase one’s prestige (2003:27). The
value of waste then, is that it is a form of consumption beyond what is physically possible in a
conventional sense. One seeks to create waste, to destroy value, in order to demonstrate to
oneself and to others ones prestige. I would push this a step further to incorporate the main tenet
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of my thesis. One is able to increase one’s prestige by appropriating the energy and low entropy
of one’s surroundings and one’s fellow creatures in order that one may demonstrate prestige,
which is no abstract concept, but a functional position, a node of accumulation that privileges an
individual with the rights to marshal a certain amount of society’s resource pool (i.e. this energy
and low entropy that is daily accumulated by the capitalist markets).
Frow (2003:27) assures us that this is no absolute process but one driven by a
“system…[which] normalizes a state of chronic dissatisfaction; and, as in potlatch, the display of
wealth in conspicuous consumption transforms comparison into competition.” The process is
always relative to the inequality already created in energetic flows and entropic gradients. Frow
(2003:27) employs the example of a dinner party as a particularly apt one for this exercise: at a
dinner party, the host situates a competitor for status in a position in which s/he “consumes
vicariously…that excess of good things” the host has been able to accumulate while
simultaneously impressing his competitor with “the host’s facility in etiquette.” Frow (2003:27)
persuades us with another distinction drawn by Veblen that the work of the elites is not
productive of “material” goods, but “immaterial goods.” The conclusion of this logic is that the
occupation of elites (i.e. “the leisure class”) is the creation of a lifestyle that Veblen characterizes
as wholly directed towards “‘arduous application to the business of learning how to live a life of
ostensible leisure in a becoming way’” (Frow 2003:27). What Frow and Veblen both neglect is
that the wasteful practices of elites are a prerequisite for occupying the nodes of accumulation
(and commensurately of consumption, creation of waste, and destruction) set forth as their
potential status in society and a consummation of their birthright (i.e. their calling).
Frow (2003:28) does engage the question of the “ceremonial servant” and the
“unemployed housewife” as an inversion of the typical consumptive relationship. The consumer
in these relationships of their social superior’s productive work is beholden to the source of their
consumption, and absent their relationship of vicarious consumption, they are unable to occupy
the same societal stratum, rendering them subordinate dependents. I would assert that recent
youth culture may very well embody the angst of occupying this subordinate, dependent
consumptive position well into what used to be the years designated as independent adulthood.
Those who are not able to occupy, as the primary agent, a node of accumulation, suffer from the
inability to achieve the societal position for which they have been socialized—in any case, the
acceptance of the full role of occupying one of these nodes has been delayed for many by the
current economic situation in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008.
Frow (2003:30) acknowledges the debt that any theory of value owes to Marx, but
instead of deeply pursuing this debt, Frow chooses to emphasize Bourdieu’s theory of habitus
and “symbolic capital.” Frow (2003) agrees with Bourdieu’s conception of the intrinsic nature
of the game of symbolic competition to sociality. Frow (2003:30-31) injects a quote by Paul
Rabinow in order to allow Rabinow to critique Bourdieu in Frow’s stead. The thrust of
Rabinow’s rebuttal of Bourdieu is primarily contingent upon the belief in the transcendent
position of the sociologist who can escape the “illusion” of the game of symbolic capital (Frow
2003:31). In no uncertain terms, despite the fact that the meaning of the game and, thus, a
significant portion of its phenomenology can be altered by a more or less healthy dose of selfreflection, there can never occur the possibility of the transcendence of the consumptive principle
as the sine qua non of human sociality!
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Much more in keeping with this tradition of consumption and even nominal donation of
value is Frow’s (2003:31) analysis of the indigenous American potlatch ceremony which has so
fascinated anthropologists who have studied the indigenous Americans of the Pacific Northwest
(Frow cites Franz Boas). Anthropologists have sought to glimpse, in the reciprocal coercion of
the potlatch, a fundamental principle of human sociality based on the creation of extravagant
waste and consumption. Perhaps, the reason that the ceremony so fascinated the modern
Western psyche was because it depends on the accumulation of value, which is then summarily
destroyed as an intrinsic portion of the consumption of that value as a cultural ritual. The ritual
is almost a form of sacrifice to the materialism of the collective, intended to allow key players to
vie for improved status and prestige in their communities. The Westerner (the one whose Moses
and prophets are accumulation, as Marx so appropriately and facetiously reminds us) faces at
once the exact mirror image of himself, both exactly alike and reversed. This is very much
evidentiary when viewed as an example of the strategic destruction of value as consumption of
that same value, a cultural trait that we Westerners share with the Tlingit (Frow 2003:31) but one
which manifests itself in a different form of social ritual. Frow (2003:32) rightly notes that the
“unreturnable [emphasis in original]” nature of the “gift” in the potlatch ceremony confers its
powerful “sacrificial” significance. Unreturnability is the ultimate form of reciprocity which
destroys all reciprocity (Sallie Mae, I would conjecture, is acutely aware of this). Frow (2003:32)
links the generation of wasted value not only with reciprocity, but also with “revulsion.” Frow
(2003:32) (who here draws from Lacan’s objet petit, or useless waste, i.e. depense) is far from
the only theorist of related anthropological or sociological matters to come to the conclusion that
the generation of waste from value is interconnected at a profound psychological level with
revulsion concerning bodily waste, as in that which our bodies literally create when consuming
energy and low-entropy and converting it to high entropy material (i.e. waste). It seems at this
level the notions of consumption, waste generation, reciprocity and power are conceptually
inseparable. I would posit, that in anthropological terms, these core concepts, along with
kinship, upon which I will presently touch, form a certain core of our understanding of mana or
the taboo. According to George Bataille, the potlatch conceptually destroys the division
alienation creates between the possession and the possessor in order to make salient within the
ritual the connection of the body of the possessor with the labor value intrinsic to the possessed
valuable items which are destroyed in sacrifice (Frow 2003:33). In considering whether the
destruction of such valuable goods in sacrifice constitutes a lack of calculation, Frow (2003:33)
sides with Mauss over Bataille: where Bataille would separate calculation of economic gain and
prestige, here Mauss sees that the very soul of calculation of prestige carries over to economic
benefits. Frow (2003:34-35) notes, albeit in a roundabout anthropological meander, that market
values can become divorced from the utilitarian value and the value of the labor required to
manufacture a valuable object; this does not disprove the former but addends an important aspect
of the “transcience” and “durability” of value over time. Frow (2003:36) concludes on the note
that technology is an interesting case for this analysis as it is neither alive nor dead. On the other
hand, the human body is a technology for gene transference and human society is a technology
for the furtherance of the human bodies that house those genes. Furthermore, all societal
management and interaction techniques (e.g. Foucault’s disciplinary institutions and regimens,
norms, values, and etiquette, etc.) are likewise technologies and inanimate objects are merely an
extension of the technological process in which our bodies are the primary constituent portions.
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The primary cause of genocide, as with all the crimes that comprise it, is the desire to
usurp the energy and low entropy of the other, as conventionally or conveniently identified. This
is manifested most obviously in the desire to eradicate so that scarce resources can be stolen,
land and other real property most especially. This does not account for the entirety of the act as
pressing the bodies of those who have been labeled as the other into service of the needs of the
genocidaires is also a primary component of genocide. This can take many forms, but
commonly takes two forms: 1) impressment into slavery, often to the point of death by
overwork, or 2) impressment into prostitution or exposure the predatory act of rape. These forms
together along with many more regional forms which manifest according to local cultural
principles (and often a heinous perversion of these principles) constitute acts directed towards
the destruction or degradation of the body in whole or in part as a symbolic canvas upon which
the existing cultural narrative of the genocidaire can be re-inscribed. Without the destruction of
the ban (in Agamben’s [1998:104-11] terms)—the sacrificial victim denied the privilege of a
sacrifice, as a sacrifice must represent the ultimate inclusion within the community, or a
“metonymy” between the possession and the possessor as Frow (2003:33,35) expresses the
relationship—there can be no “unreturnable” (2003:32) to the numinous, a prerequisite to
inscribing culture and structure into the reality of society which is composed of human flesh.
Section II.viii: Entropy exploitation as a cultural strategy
In composing his volume on the topic of the cannibalistic syndrome he saw enveloping
Western society, Columbus and Other Cannibals (1979/2008:38-39), Jack Forbes, the progenitor
of the discipline of modern indigenous American studies, admits that even on these shores,
indigenous Americans (Mexico and Peru, which Forbes compares to ancient Egypt and Asia)
began to engage in similar exploitative practices to the Europeans. Forbes (1979/2008:22-25)
employs an Algonquian term from his own culture for his theory of a cultural contamination—
“Wetiko” (or “Windigo”)—with which Forbes believes Christopher Columbus infected the New
World. While clearly the structural strategy called Wetiko had been discovered here; it is
difficult to argue against Forbes’s assertion that the problem grew out of control as a result of
European colonization. Windigo psychosis is also well known to Western anthropologists who
study indigenous American cultures as a label for a sort of mythical monster as well as a
cosmologically related syndrome that afflicts people who have cannibalized their own group
members, often their own families, as a result of life threatening famine8 and are driven mad with
guilt in the aftermath (Hay 1971).
The practices of the Wetiko social system outlined by Forbes can be traced to
communities which developed greater social organization and stratification—the most
rudimentary and foundational technologies which led to the possibility of more efficient low
entropy conversion. Forbes (1979/2008:25) draws a comparison between all strategies of
Wetiko cannibalism, insisting that the only difference between exploitation that results in
unlivable conditions for those exploited and outright murder along caste lines is the speed with
which the will, agency, autonomy, and bodily integrity of those whose are targeted is
8

While no longer a real threat, cannibalism during famines was a real possibility for centuries
for many people living in the subarctic region where many nations observing this mythical
construct originate. Modern food distribution negates the short growing season that used to be
the primary cause of famine.
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incorporated into the project of the perpetrators of such cannibalism. According to Forbes
(1979/2008:25), Nazism was “a German form of cannibalism designed to consume Jews,
Gypsies [the Roma], Poles, and other Slavs in order to fatten Germans;” similarly “AngloAmerican imperialism is a form of cannibalism designed to ‘eat’ Indians [indigenous Americans]
and also to consume the Native people’s land and resources.” Forbes (1979/2008:25) drives his
point home by emphasizing that the consumption he observes is not “symbolic” but that “the
wealthy and exploitative literally consume the lives of those they exploit [emphasis in original].”
It is with this in mind that I suggest that, far from a purely cultural trait, the discovery of these
methods of low entropy extraction are a structurally based technology which has been
independently discovered across space and time. Its effectiveness is the main testament to the
reason for its continued existence. Power differentials between peoples are generated by the
ability to extract low entropy sources and convert them to high entropy waste. That is what we
refer to as “power” in human terms.
Despite the discovery of the techniques of more efficient low entropy source exploitation,
indigenous Americans, like other small-scale societies, have subsisted without call for them for
millennia. Even in the Americas, a majority of peoples depended on organizational strategies
that sought harmony between individuals in the community and maintained buffer zones for
entropic extraction from the forests, waterways, and horticultural fields. In the limited but
notable cases of the Aztec and Inca, systems that more closely resembled Old World social
organization arose. Forbes (1979/2008) and Hornborg (2011) both acknowledge this feature of
these sorts of New World developments in relation to the extractive project of society.
I am interested in resolving some of the tensions between the different Old World and
New World strategies, separated for millennia of development, but each is valuable in its own
way. To explore the connection and attempt to reconcile the differences between the project of
the colonizers of the globe and indigenous strategies of less extractive subsistence will be the
preeminent challenge for global society in the 21st century. To this purpose, an indigenous
critique combined with observations from the European tradition should serve to highlight
philosophical conflict and to illuminate arenas in which progress can be achieved.
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Part III
Formulating a syncretic knowledge based on indigenous observations

Section III.i: Sites for syncretism
The strategies of governance and exclusion/inclusion previously discussed are strategies
which are to some degree generalizable, but reach their violent and destructive extremes only
with the introduction of modern social systems and technologies. While there is evidence of
structures of increasing inequality and rigid stratification from the oral and written histories and
archaeological records from across both the old and new worlds, these structures became
globally dominant facilitated and accompanied by certain cultural peculiarities that proved the
matrix for their regional developments. Only in the collision of the rapidly modernized cultures
with the cultures that more closely resemble (in terms of technological complexity and degree of
social stratification) all of those from which we all came not very long ago can we realize the
difference in our lived experiences through the juxtaposition of our cultural and structural
strategies. This juxtaposition illuminates our different methods of exploiting low entropy
sources. More importantly, small-scale, traditional societies can teach us technologies for
managing the deleterious effects of entropy conversion that might be adaptable to the large-scale
problems of modern societies. Much of the difference is present in a certain political perspective
which is largely absent from Western politics. It is in the interest of theorizing the potential for
this juncture of different knowledges and the inclusion of this political perspective that I proceed.
I will focus on the points at which several influential Western and indigenous scholars agree as a
potential site for this inclusion.
It is imperative that we modern Western people who live in industrialized cultures must
develop a new cultural imaginary which—rather than merely miming or appropriating
indigenous cultural structures—must build from them a new mystification and a new rationality
in order to develop a much needed alternative knowledge. The knowledge that has been built by
what Russell Means (1995:553) calls the “death culture” will only result in what Schiller and
Weber (Gerth and Mills 1946:51) considered the “rational” “disenchantment” of all human
value. Were this system only providing a good standard of living for everyone in material terms,
the cost would still be too high if the cost were, as it has historically so often been, the creation
of an atomized society, devoid of an intelligible sense of meaning or purpose. As we now know,
however, the very strategies of simultaneously disenchanting Western European culture—the
culture of endless, aimless accumulation—while acculturating and assimilating all external
groups, leads to the weakening of all forms of societal resistance. This is primarily problematic
because a society must maintain—at its core—principles of fraternity, equality, and liberty, the
principles of the French Revolution and other enlightenment era revolutionary movements, for a
popular democratic renegotiation of problems to result in success.
Jalata (2011a:146-47) concludes his argument for a “critical [self] interrogation” by
“Euro-Americans” (2011a:130) descended from the colonial genocidaires and “terrorists”
(2011a:130) who founded our nation in blood, torture, gunfire, chains, and oppression by issuing
a grave warning that should we not heed his call we will endanger our chances to “morally,
ethically, culturally, socially, religiously, philosophically, and politically” “develop [our] full
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humanness” (2011a:146). I could not concur more strongly, but to this I should like to add
another dire warning: the wages of our ethnocultural myopia and willful ignorance may be our
complete self-destruction. This is a common warning from indigenous people. I will supply two
particularly pertinent examples.
First, is Frank Tenorio’s (“secretary of the All-Indian Pueblo Council,”[Steiner 1976:86]
Pueblo, San Felipe Pueblo, New Mexico) testimony concerning the Pueblo defense of their
traditional water rights reproduced in Steiner’s (1976:87-90) volume on the dangers of not
critically analyzing white culture. Tenorio explains (Steiner 1976:87):
I have been involved in the fight to save our people’s water for many
years. Against us we have arrayed the forces of federal, state, and
local governments, as well as private interests of powerful
corporations and individuals. In our fight we stand alone against the
combined interests of the most powerful country the world has ever
known.

This is a grim explanation of an even less hopeful situation. Tenorio is, however, encouragingly
stalwart, perhaps from the courage which originates in the loss of alternatives. Tenorio continues
that he styles himself a “hematologist” of sorts because the water is the “blood of the Pueblo
people” (Steiner 1976:87). The reader might wonder why I would select an obscure reference
from 1976, but not only does the position of the Pueblo typify the position of indigenous
Americans in relation to Euro-American power structures, Tenorio’s vision of the stakes of the
negotiations between disempowered indigenous groups and powerful state and corporate entities
offers particular clarity.
Tenorio explains that his culture will be destroyed if the water upon which his ancient
community depends is diverted for corporate or public use by an influx of Euro-Americans
(Steiner 1976:88). He states (Steiner 1976:88) that the “Great Spirit” did not allow his people to
preserve themselves for millennia and then “intend for [them] to shrivel up and die and [their]
bones to be scattered, only to be remembered in anthropology textbooks.” Tenorio (Steiner
1976:88) reminds us of the dangers of capitalism and its effects by asserting that his people are
particularly valuable because they are “as a people” “one of the few custodians of this kind
[sustainable living] of knowledge left” concluding that “[m]aybe this kind of knowledge is what
the world will need to survive.” Tenorio claims (Steiner 1976:88) that the government
agencies—intent to divert Pueblo water supplies—are nothing but conquistadors or US Cavalry
by other names, but assures us that “[w]e [the Pueblo] will also learn the ways of our adversaries
who hide behind such initials as BIA [Bureau of Indian Affairs] or BLM [Bureau of Land
Management], and we will survive them, too [as the Pueblo have survived the Spanish and
Anglo colonists].” The most important part of Tenorio’s warning for the interest of this research,
however, is his conceptualization of what it means for Euro-Americans to partake in their own
cultural project. Tenorio’s warning is not atypical of advice from indigenous philosophers and
theorists who represent a species of organic intellectual in the Gramscian sense, a category that
Buechler characterizes as “most likely to engage in counter-hegemonic work by puncturing the
dominant ideology, revealing its class biases, and articulating the interests of subordinate
classes” (Buechler 2011:22). Tenorio theorizes (Steiner 1976:89):
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There is something suicidal in the non-Indian’s belief in everexpanding development and his belief in his ability to be able to
continually reform nature through technology. The Southwest, in
terms of water supply, can only support a limited number of people;
that is a fact of life. The fact is that the Great Spirit put only so much
water on this earth, and that is a fact the white man refuses to
confront.

This is a statement that can extend to other resources and other regions. As long as EuroAmericans, Europeans, and the European diaspora continue to desire to grow beyond the
restrictions of nature, the resistance (from within, without, and from the natural parameters of the
human condition) is likely to increase, creating a situation of diminishing returns. This is what
we Euro-Americans have to learn as a people; sometimes we must adapt to our limitations rather
than forcing our limitations to adapt to us, unless we want to engage in a project which Tenorio
refers to as the “the prolongation of the white man’s suicide” (Steiner 1976:89). The means of
interfering in the project of the prolongation of the white man’s suicide are an entirely different
matter. The forces which are to be marshalled must—by dire need—be
sociocultural/ethnocultural. “Top-down” structures have failed. It is only in the recognition by
white America that there is a desperate problem that any salvation of the indigenous peoples or
Euro-Americans can be devised.
The second example of the observations of an indigenous American theorist on the selfdestructive nature of US culture comes from Russell Means—who is even more candid and even
less hopeful for Euro-American culture than Tenorio. The late American Indian Movement
activist, actor, and philosopher of European/Euro-American power relations with indigenous
peoples gave a speech in the Black Hills in 1980 (Means 1995:545-554, Appendix)—a highly
symbolic and holy site for his Yankton community, and other Lakota, as well—in which he
polemicized European/Euro-American culture in great detail and with a deftness that epitomized
his characteristic eloquence. Means states (1995:546):
I’m not saying that on the one hand there are the by-products of a
few thousand years of genocidal, reactionary European intellectual
development which is bad; and on the other hand there is some new
revolutionary intellectual development which is good. I’m referring
here to the so-called theories of Marxism and anarchism and
“leftism” in general. I don’t believe these theories can be separated
from the rest of the European intellectual tradition. It’s really just
the same old song.

Means is theorizing what would seem to us in sociology to be a very radical platform indeed.
Means claims to reject European thought wholesale. While it seems an impossible project in the
contemporary United States, even coming from the perspective of an indigenous American from
a reservation, the political theory is audaciously innovative. What would such a project look
like, one which conflated and collapsed the left and the right in Euro-American politics—eliding
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any semblance of separation and rejecting the assumptions of European political thought? Can
we, in academia, even conceive of such a project? If we are up to the challenge, this project
envisioned by a frustrated Russell Means over thirty years ago is the one we should be
undertaking.
Means continues in an even more fundamentally radical direction by rejecting European
thought more broadly; Means condemns the work of Newton as “reducing the physical universe
to a linear mathematical equation,” and the work of Descartes as doing the same to “culture,” as
Means claims Locke also did with “politics,” and Smith with “economics” (1995:546). Means
(1995:547) indicts Hegel and Marx, as well: Hegel for “secularizing theology” and Marx for
centralizing “materialism.” While Marx appreciated the detriment that a pure materialism can
bring to the life of the wage-laborer more so than Means give him credit for doing, Means is
correct that the central logic of Marx was more a continuation and less a break with traditional
European thought than is sometimes supposed. Marx is still demonized in capitalist nations that
have sought to vilify Communists for reactionary political reasons. Means (1995:547) is also
correct that the historical record of the actions (e.g. mass starvation, political assassinations,
banishment of dissenters into forced labor camps) of the advocates of “a new Marxist form of
European imperialism,” (e.g. Stalin, Tito, or Mao [by philosophy, not race or ethnicity]), do not
speak favorably of the innovative nature of a Marxist politico-economic constellation. Means
(1995) answers the void left in the wake of the conservative neo-liberal platform and the liberal
socialist platform with a decentering indigenous American formulation of political economy.
Means (1995:547) asserts that the real difference is not to be found in left or right, but in “the
conflict between being and gaining.” This difference, according to Means (1995), is the
difference between buying societal prestige through selfish accumulation and earning prestige
through personal improvement and a generous ethic of communal redistribution. I must admit
that at first glance, neither seems particularly momentous, even though the indigenous American
arrangement seems more egalitarian and presents an emotive appeal to those sensitized to value
generosity as a virtue superior to competition; however, in practice we have seen the cumulative
ills of the right-left dichotomous political system and should, therefore, prefer an innovative
departure as an opportunity to make improvements to a badly broken system.
In his rejection of European thought concerning modernity, I wonder if Means ever
discovered that his conclusions were relatively similar to those of several later European
theorists (more recent than Marx), notably the Frankfurt School theorists, especially Walter
Benjamin, and Michel Foucault. The similarities in the conclusions to which the Frankfurt
School theorists and Russell Means come, quite possibly separately, organically, and through
convergence, are quite remarkable. First, I will present an excerpt from the same speech by
Means quoted above; second, I will compare the previous with an excerpt from Benjamin’s The
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (1936); and third, I will juxtapose the prior
analyses with a passage from Foucault’s lectures at the College de France (1976).
Means invokes the theoretical principles of Weberian disenchantment (a phrase borrowed
from Friedrich Schiller [Gerth and Mills 1946:51]) and Foucault’s (1976/2003:260) “sovereign
right to kill” in his explanation of the dangers of the European cosmology. Means explains
(1995:547):
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The European materialist tradition of despiritualizing the universe is
very similar to the mental process which goes into dehumanizing
another person. And who seems most expert at dehumanizing other
people? And why? Soldiers who have seen a lot of combat learn to
do this to the enemy before going back into combat. Murderers do
it before going out to commit murder. Nazi SS guards did it to
concentration camp inmates. Cops do it. Corporation leaders do it
to the workers they send into uranium mines and steel mills.
Politicians do it to everyone in sight. And what the process has in
common for each group doing the dehumanizing is that it makes it
all right to kill and otherwise destroy other people…In terms of the
despiritualization of the universe, the mental process works so that
it becomes virtuous to destroy the planet. Terms like progress and
development are used as cover words here, the way victory and
freedom are used to justify butchery in the dehumanization
process…Ultimately, the whole universe is open—in the European
view—to this sort of insanity.

First, to the association of European thought with fascism by way of Means’s indictment of
National Socialism: Benjamin (1968), Horkheimer and Adorno (1947/2002), and later Foucault
(1976/2003) and Agamben (1998) all theorize on this particular issue in compatible, reconcilable
ways. In fact, we may trace the recognition of the irrational rationalism of the European/EuroAmerican bureaucracy all the way back to Marx and Weber. Marx (1867:VII.XXIV.43)
classically captured the emotive intellectual response to the ultimate logic of capitalism when he
exclaimed—in Capital, Volume One—“Accumulate, accumulate! That is Moses and the
prophets!” Similarly, Weber noted at the end of his most influential essay, “The Protestant
Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism” that capitalist “ascetic rationalism” (1905/2002:121) is
essentially illogical and doomed to remain so as long as capital fulfills a religious function for
the most influential segments of European/Euro-American societies (1905/2002:115-122). It
must be explicitly stated that the development of Western thought has not been an uncontested
process, alternative knowledge can be traced back in the Modern era at least to the foundational
period of Protestantism and Modernity, in fact the prevailing knowledge that has developed had
to first challenge the hegemonic knowledge of the Roman Catholic Church; unfortunately, we
understand, through the work of Weber (1905/2002), that the prevailing knowledge, while
originally developing from a popular movement, was co-opted by Power shortly after its
inception and has been pressed into its ever intensifying project ever since.
Walter Benjamin, in the Post-Great War years and while witnessing the development and
consolidation of the National Socialist state in Germany, theorized what the development of an
intensive project of European cultural rationality aided by industrialization could only lead to an
unprecedented destruction of humanity, extending past the bodies and buildings destroyed, and
even into the cultural imaginary of society. Benjamin asserts (1968:244):
The destructiveness of war furnishes proof that society has not been
mature enough to incorporate technology as its organ, that
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technology has not been sufficiently developed to cope with the
elemental forces of society. The horrible features of imperialistic
warfare are attributable to the discrepancy between the tremendous
means of production and their inadequate utilization in the process
of production—in other words, to unemployment and the lack of
markets. Imperialistic war is a rebellion of technology which
collects, in the form of “human material,” the claims to which
society has denied its natural material. Instead of draining rivers,
society directs a human stream into a bed of trenches; instead of
dropping seeds from airplanes, it drops incendiary bombs over
cities; and through gas warfare the aura is abolished in a new way.

Benjamin was not the last to note the destructive tendencies of the European state of mind run
amok. In a lecture in 1976 at the College de France, Foucault explained the interrelation of
Nazism, death, and biopower in society in a succinct and insightful description (1976/2003:25960):
The objective of the Nazi regime was therefore not really the
destruction of other races. The destruction of other races was one
aspect of the project, the other being to expose its own race to the
absolute and universal threat of death. Risking one’s life, being
exposed to total destruction, was one of the principles inscribed in
the basic duties of the obedient Nazi, and it was one of the essential
objectives of Nazism’s policies…Exposing the entire population to
universal death was the only way it could truly constitute itself as a
superior race and bring about its definitive regeneration once other
races had been either exterminated or enslaved forever. We have,
then, in Nazi society something that is really quite extraordinary:
this is a society which has generalized biopower in an absolute
sense, but which has also generalized the sovereign right to kill. The
two mechanisms—the classic, archaic mechanism that gave the
State the right of life and death over its citizens, and the new
mechanism organized around discipline and regulation, or in other
words, the new mechanism of biopower—coincide exactly. We can
therefore say this: The Nazi State makes the field of the life it
manages, protects, guarantees, and cultivates in biological terms
absolutely coextensive with the sovereign right to kill anyone,
meaning not only other people, but also its own people.

Foucault centralizes the link held between the destructive rationality of the concepts of
fascism/anti-Semitism and other forms of racism as imagined by the Frankfurt School theorists,
Benjamin (1968) and Horkheimer and Adorno (1947/2002). Foucault characterizes the Western
state as a sort of lethally paternal horror, a sort of Saturn who devours his sons, lest they
overthrow their father. Perhaps, the meaning of the Nazi regime to the Nazis was a form of self54

purification of the racial body politic in adherence with ancient Indo-Aryan religious conceptions
such as those that support the racial caste system at its core, according to Stone (1976).
There is no reason to suspect that the racism of fascism—an outgrowth of the same
European cultural constellations as the capitalist world system, the former being inseparably
intertwined with the latter—should ultimately function any differently in its central logic against
other non-white races than it did against the Jews in 1940s Europe. Even though the industrial
scale of the destruction of the Holocaust defies the imagination, the horrors of European and
Euro-American forms of plantation slavery certainly constitute a similar tragedy. As to the
central logic of the destruction of the African people/African American people, Clarke literally
calls the destruction a “holocaust” (Jalata 2002:33). Not only do we have to concern ourselves
with overt, acute genocidal policies of mass-murder, displacement and slavery, but more
structurally embedded policies also have prevailed in certain contexts that result in similar
genocidal destruction of peoples and cultures. Jalata (2002:36) indicts the Jim Crow laws that
“White America” “enforced” “through primitive kinds of social control, such as lynching,
torture, terror, mutilation, rape, castration, and imprisonment.” The reservation system,
according to Means (1995), brought with it similar forms of “primitive kinds of social control”
(Jalata 2002:36).
Perhaps, Means (1995) is correct in his suspicions about the dangers presented by the
right and the left. Without democratic principles however, a state would cease to be beneficial
and must immediately become oppressive in its functionality. Therefore, we are presented with a
paradox, and it is this paradox that indigenous Americans may very well be able to resolve,
through their fresh approach to broken European/Euro-American politics. We must resolve our
fetishism of “gaining” and develop a political economy of “being” (Means 1995:547).
We need to formulate a different approach to the problems of modern society than can be
provided by the right and the left; we must decenter and decentralize this false distinction and
gain perspective on the entirety of the Western project from without. As so much of the
available education in the United States and in the world is influenced by this thinking, we must
seek sources of alternative knowledge construction. This is very much in accord with the project
of Jalata (2011b:64) to formulate and construct “knowledge for liberation” against “knowledge
for domination.” Means expresses an important principle, which he refers to as a “rule of
thumb:” “[y]ou cannot judge the real nature of a European revolutionary doctrine on the basis of
the changes it proposes to make within the European power structure and society,” but “only” by
the effects it will have on non-European peoples” (1995:548). Means (1995:548) explains his
position in relation to what he calls the “European power structure and society” as based on the
fact that “every revolution in European history has served to reinforce Europe’s tendencies and
abilities to export destruction to other peoples, other cultures, and the environment itself.”
Means elucidates that his ultimate problem with the colonizers of the land originally held
by his indigenous people is “not a racial proposition, but a cultural proposition;” Means
distinguishes between the “Caucasian race” and the “European outlook” (1995:552). Means
(1995:552) explains that indigenous Americans “don’t want power over white institutions; we
want white institutions to disappear.” It is Means’s (1995:552) position that “American Indians”
can “share European values,” and this is the situation which he derides. We must strive to
embrace the opposite. Means (1995:553) envisions a world of gender and racial equality to
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replace what he calls the “death culture.” The final warning issued by Means (1995:554) in his
speech is that we must reject a “culture which regularly confuses revolution with continuation,
which confuses science and religion, which confuses revolt with resistance” because such a
culture “has nothing helpful to teach you” and “nothing to offer you as a way of life.”
Jalata (2011a:147) invokes “the rule of law” as a necessary mechanism by which the state
of affairs in the United States can be improved, however, upon this point, I remain dubious. It is
by means of the rule of law that a majority of Euro-American atrocities have been perpetrated,
neither is this atypical of European affairs involving indigenous others. Can law be engineered
to save the people from a project from which they do not recognize a need to be saved? I think
not. Although, as white American culture is hopelessly intertwined with the concept of Law,
writ large, as a normative mechanism which pervades every aspect of human life, law will have
to follow suit with a cultural shift to consolidate the legitimacy of a paradigm shift. Jalata
(2011a:147) is correct, but the situation is a tense and unpromising one. The problem with law is
a problem of the distinction between practical power and theoretical regulation. Tenorio refers
to this as a problem of “law” versus “might” (Steiner 1976:89) and pertinently and eruditely cites
President Andrew Jackson’s infamous executive order (Steiner 1976:90) to flippantly circumvent
the decision of the Supreme Court against the removal of the Cherokee—deliberately ignoring
the spirit and the letter of the US Constitutional “checks and balances system” to the detriment of
indigenous people.

Section III.ii: Conclusion
A culture that must be forced on its people is not a culture that succeeds in the primary
project of a culture; it succeeds in nothing beyond creating a violent, oppressive tyranny. An
interesting consideration for the context of North America is the tendency of Euro-Americans to
choose to adopt and maintain indigenous cultures when the option presented itself. Axtell
(1981:168-206) cites numerous examples of people adopted by the indigenous Americans in
North America who would only return to Euro-American culture under the coercion of political
force and even then, with expressions of great sadness and longing for the community and
culture they were forfeiting. Kupperman (2000:218) explains that “[r]unning away to the Indians
was punished by death” in the early English colonies which were run like military camps, even
though a majority of the inhabitants were civilians. The rhythms of life are described by
Kupperman (2000:218) as strict; rhythms which would be very much attuned to the inscription of
the Protestant ethic upon the populous by coercion. The English proved incapable of
encouraging the adoption of the Protestant work ethic by volition alone, so they resorted to an
externally prescribed “discipline” in Foucauldian terms (1975/1995:137).
The strength of the potential for a syncretic indigenous discourse at this historical
juncture lies in the potential of such a development to improve the lives of indigenous people by
privileging their theories and their knowledge in a way that renders their invaluable contributions
accessible to the rest of us who are in dire need of alternative ideas. In the past, power has
always assimilated, coopted, or appropriated indigenous knowledge in order to oppress the
indigenous peoples and continue the process of capitalist extractive accumulation. We may have
entered a new phase of rationalism in which we have created a global concentration camp
(Agamben 1998:166) in which what Nyers (2006:124) calls a permanent state of
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“refugeeness,”—a form of Agamben’s “bare life,” Nyers states—characterizes life in our society.
In replacing the hegemonic knowledge constellation by privileging indigenous knowledge with a
respectful centrality, it might be possible not only to limit but even to reverse some portion of the
harms done to indigenous communities. Speaking as a Euro-American, I must wonder, in
attempting to help indigenous cultures persevere, might we also discover the knowledge to save
ourselves?
As of the economic crisis of 2008-09, developing an alternative hegemonic knowledge
may very well be a real possibility which could not have been previously considered for
mainstream acceptance. The Occupy Movement and the Arab Spring, among other youth
movements—suppressed by power and violence though they may be—signify a moment in
history which opens up possibilities of real change through popular unrest. We have not
resembled the youth of the ‘60s and ‘70s in our rebelliousness, but perhaps resistance does not
appear as obviously it once did. The Millennials represent the most educated population in the
history of the United States and, perhaps, one of the most in the history of the world. Is it
possible that we are biding our time to change the world more quietly and passively when the
torch has been passed, a glorious and bloodless coup? The possibility that this coup is currently
ruminating in the cultural imaginary of the modern hipster—its nascence developing behind the
screen of her still coal-powered Apple computer—is a reassuring thought. Is it possible, instead,
that an entire generation has been so completely coopted by power and pacified that we are
doomed to repeat the destructive strategies we have been taught to emulate?
It is difficult for me to believe that the effects of globalization on culture have had no
effect in generating increased tolerance and a sense of pervasive cosmopolitanism. My hope for
the future lies not in improved technology but in the improved social mores which may yet
render that technology beneficial in its applications. Can we build, not a single nation, but a
single tribe? The impediments are as momentous as the opportunity, but it is a challenge which I
hope against nearly insurmountable odds that my generation will be able to rise to meet. Can we
envision a political culture beyond right and left—one built on global awareness and local
action? Will we employ the tools of informal social networks and our blossoming celebration of
difference as points of democratic public discourse in order to realize this vision? Perhaps, what
the Baby-Boomers are misreading as inactivity in the Millennials (largely a result of an extra two
billion people who appeared in the last twenty years, industry intent on improving profits by
means of mechanization, and the relatively low wages paid by many service-sector positions) is,
in actuality, a birth-pang of a new global commonality born in a globalized culture.
The greatest mistake we can make in undertaking the project of understanding the global
capitalist economy is to uncritically accept the value-laden judgments of the disciplines most
closely supportive of the functioning of our current distribution systems. What we must attempt
is a disentangling of cosmological skeins in order to unburden ourselves of the value laden
language used to construct our counterintuitive deviant subculture of capitalists. It is the position
of these people in our current system to generate imaginary numerical values through the
sacrifice of actual human lives. They sacrifice these lives in wars, most overtly, but also by
directing employees to disregard safety procedures in place for their protection and by not
supplying these employees with the best technology and methods available in the conduct of the
duties of their employment (Box 1983). “The masters of mankind” (Smith 1776/1937:WN
III:iv:389) likewise sacrifice the poor and the underemployed, children and the elderly, en masse
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in order to improve their profit margins in terms of a currency with only culturally assigned
value and commodities which in many cases do not in fact, actually exist.
The logic that political economists, political scientists, and other sociologists attempt to
employ against it is a logic which observes a predetermined outcome at a fixed point. This
outcome can be millennialist, progressive, or conservative. A radical, decentered criminological
theory of modern society is needed. The project of society itself, and indeed of civilization, has
amounted to nothing more than a crime committed against the human animal by the human
animal. In defying our primate troop behavior and binding together as organic tissues in a
massive body, we have superseded our capacity to act rationally, or to fully empower ourselves
to utilize our moral agency. We have precluded, in this phenomenologically imminent criminal
action, any possibility of “Justice,” and the realization of any of the revolutionary enlightenment
values to which late humanists still cling, such as the French Revolutionary values of Equality,
Liberty, and Fraternity (Nussbaum 2013). It is only through ultimately recognizing the greatest
crime in history that we can begin to restore some measure of operationalized liberty and
individualism. Rights are key. Without rights, the individual does, for all practical intents and
purposes, not, in fact, exist. Liberals and neo-liberals agree on one governing principle in
particular that is of primary interest: rights are completely negotiable by governance. This is the
most flawed logical position. A right is not a right when it is a privilege to be suspended at will
by the mob, whether by a despotic conspiracy of elites or by a tyrannical laity. If the individuals
rights are not a fixed reference point, the individual sinks into the post-humanist bog of
constituting a cell in a vast tissue, and all of our more abstract ideals of morality become hollow
semblances of themselves. Rights are endlessly inconvenient, which is why governments have
sought to destroy them and interested parties have largely acquiesced without a struggle,
especially as of late in the United States. It is the very dialectic of the right that courts were
designed to conduct as a protection of the rights of the individual. Due process of law is both
economically costly and politically unseemly and has largely been done away with (plea
bargains) in favor of a farcical over-reaching of the state’s “sovereign right to punish,” or the
“right of the Sword,” as Foucault (1976/2003:260) termed it.
Far from being beneficial and emancipatory, the project of the dominant mass culture,
(capitalist, communist, socialist, &c.) and the projects of civilization they represent have
relegated humans—creatures who were largely dependent on smaller village units throughout
most of their history (Dunbar 2010) and who originally exercised a fair degree of agency without
formal restraint—to the status of merely perfunctory organs in a body, and they have become, in
the presence of a cancerous overgrowth of this tissue, merely biomass to recycle through the
greater machinery of humankind—a sort of useful adipose tissue, a cushion for more critical
organs. The current cell-like status of the individual is the definition of inhumanity—what
Agamben (1998:166) refers to as conditio inhumana. The complete incorporation of the
individual into the social structure is the source of objectification as defined by Nussbaum
(1995). This constellation of social technologies is the key component for genocide and other
mass violence to occur. Disposable human beings are generated by society for its own utility
and spend their lives being exploited by a system in which their agency was intended to be
claustrophobically constrained due to no fault of their own. They are packaged in uniforms,
warehoused in institutions, and used up before being discarded. This deletion of the possibility
for autonomy coupled with a commensurate deletion of the possibility for agency is an evil
which is particularly pernicious within the capitalist system—the system in which elaborate
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constructs of debt bondage drive wage laborers to accept a socially deleterious arrangement. The
people enmeshed by these systems live in what is effectively slavery before being cast aside
when their utility has been consumed. This consumption is the inherent cannibal fetish of the
capitalist (MacCannell 1992). The expansion of this system is a metaphysical cannibalism of the
human race.
In order to combat this phenomenon, we must explore solutions which harness our innate
behavioral tendencies. The intuitive answer to questions of the feasibility of smaller scale
communities when posed to a Western modern, is of course that it is impossible to operate, or
even to conceive of modern technologies without mass culture, mass governance and the other
social technologies at play when a dramatically expansive homogenized population is involved.
Perhaps, however, a certain gradual, voluntary population reduction by intervals combined with
a neo-tribalism of smaller political units would remedy the problems we seem to be intensifying
with large, involuntarily homogenized, conformist populations. There is some evidence that we
may be moving in that direction now with the formation of neo-citystates—our vast 21st century
metropolises which have taken on a character all their own. Are we glimpsing the development
of a future in which mass cultural units will each have their own distinct local flavor, while
adhering to the rule of law and standardized economic regulations and practices of a one-world
confederation? It looks very much like this is what we shall see by the closing of the 21st
century.
That which we can name, we can learn to control. We may eventually learn to channel
the incorporation of low entropy in a self-conscious manner; this will allow humankind to draw
low entropy from our environment and from each other in a balanced manner. Once we
recognize the material harm done, as it is being done, in every social interaction, every economic
exchange, perhaps we will stand as aghast as so many now do at the mistreatment of animals and
each other in the preceding centuries.
No force can be more crucial to understand as we progress in a new millennium. If we are
to develop as a global, human civilization, the comprehension of the effects of our economic
entropic exchange will illuminate the resounding effects of the inscription of our will onto
material reality. It is only in understanding the full extent of our systemic inputs and outputs that
we can divorce our thinking from a currency based economy in order to arrive at one based in the
real economy of people, materials, and the gradients of energy expenditure and waste generation
that characterize the essence of our interactions.
If we appreciate our need to generate waste from value, and the deeper meaning of such
prosaic terms which are so nonchalantly discussed on a daily basis, then perhaps we can loosen
the grip of our current primitivism when confronting the imminent realities of our existence. To
understand the compulsion towards oblivion and destruction, what Freud (1920/1961:47) calls
the “Todestriebe” or “death instincts,” we must courageously face the precariousness of the
human condition for only in our acceptance of this aspect of humanity can we possibly attempt to
preempt the unnecessary destructiveness it can so apparently generate. Furthermore, the better
we understand the source of our sustenance, the better we can appreciate the necessity to protect
it in its scarcity and to assure its perpetual renewability. If we look beyond the materials in front
of our eyes and witness the flows along the gradients of entropy, we may glimpse the ethereal
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nature of the maintenance of our physical existence. It was always there, we intuited it, but it is
time that we are metacognitive about it. We must live the flow of entropy before waking eyes.
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